The recent US mission to get Osama without the knowledge of Pakistan Air Force was a success because of PAF’s lack of investment in sensors that can detect low flying aircraft in undulating and hilly terrain. This is not the first time that PAF has been caught in this embarrassing situation. Indian Air Force was able to penetrate deep into Pakistani territory in 1971, knowing that PAF did not have low level radar coverage in many areas.  At that time PAF depended on mobile observer units (MOUs) for human visual and aural detection of planes.  This man power intensive brute force effort only worked in limited areas and only during war. Despite investing in limited low altitude radars and airborne radars it is obvious that there are gaping holes in the air defense system as exemplified by the unscathed operation of multiple large rotor helicopters for hours in Pakistani airspace deep into its territory.

This story is specially poignant because way back in 1977 when I graduated from College of Aeronautical Engineering in Korangi Karachi, I had won the best project award for designing a device for acoustic detection of low to medium altitude flying aircraft. The Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan was the chief guest at the graduation and, knowing the vulnerabilities that PAF had experienced during the 1971 war, instructed that PAF should productize and widely deploy and advanced version of the device that I had designed. I was posted to a squadron that was dedicated to developing electronic warfare equipment with this goal in mind. Unfortunately ACM Zulfiqar retired and ACM Anwar Shamin became the new Chief of PAF. He and some of his coterie of highly corrupt senior officers were  unfortunately more interested in getting commissions from buying radars and other equipment from foreign countries. Not only was my project canceled but I was also not allowed to design or develop other electronic warfare equipment locally.

PAF has bought radars for the detection of low flying aircraft called MPDR as well as airborne radar planes called AWACs. The MPDR radars have limited ranges of a maximum of 90 km. So a large number of them have to be deployed to cover any reasonable area. They tend to get deployed to cover critical areas during wartime.

PAF also has three Swedish made and one Chinese made AWAC. They are relatively slow propeller driven planes that are expensive to maintain in the air at all times. The number of AWACs is also limited so they are used with care.

Since no PAF spokesman or anyone else has tried to explain the failure to detect to Pakistanis, I will try to shed some light in simplified terms. Pakistani media has further confused the issue by focusing on the wrong aspects that PAF was trying to conserve the life of its long range radars. First of all there is not much money to be saved by keeping these long range radars off and secondly even if they had been on and they were most probably were, they would not have been able to detect low flying helicopters in the northern hills as they cannot provide that kind of coverage.

No matter how much stealth technology you apply to a helicopter the large rotor makes it highly detectable to radars.  It has recently been disclosed that large non stealth twin rotor Chinook helicopters had also been used. Had the AWACS been in the air and on location they would have easily detected the helicopters. But this is not being considered war time, they were not flying. The slow speed of propeller driven AWACs meant that they could not have been sent over the area in response to the scramble after hearing the news from Abbottabad. MPDRs could have detected the copters, but Pakistan has only a limited numbers and are deployed on the eastern fronts or close to high value areas like airfields.  This leaves vast areas in the northern mountains essentially uncovered by any sensor. This is actually quite tragic given that it is quite easy to deploy the kinds of sensor that I had developed way back in 1977.  Cheap solar powered version of those sensors can easily be linked using low power communications to instrument the whole northern areas.

The two F-16s that were scrambled in response were essentially flying blind at night trying to figure out where to look in a very wide area.  PAF chief recently made a statement that with the induction of three more Chinese AWACS PAF will be able to provide radar coverage for all of Pakistan.  If you take into account war time attrition, jamming, turn around time etc. the effective force of AWACs that can be relied upon to be available at any one time is at the most two to three at any one time. With a radius of only couple of hundred miles, this would only protect Sargodha and Karachi vicinities at best. They will also need to be effectively protected with fighters which would make the cost of operations quite high and not easily sustainable over a long time. What PAF really needs are more AWACs on a jet driven fast platform that can accompany the fighters to provide cost effective deterrence.  The PAF chief needs to get realistic and ask for what is needed for the effective protection rather than making tall claims.

The pilots in PAF occupy such a glorified position that their leadership results in the acquisition of sexy fighters like F-16s at the cost of smart combination of tools that deliver cost effective and efficient defense solutions.  PAF is still buying expensive US made fighter planes when there are multiple opportunities of partnering with other friendly countries to produce planes for her needs.  The much touted JF-17 was nearly cancelled as many pilots thought it would be a threat to more F-16 procurement. Again a change in leadership saved it. PAF is the only air force in the world that runs an aircraft manufacturing institution.  The reason no other country’s air force does that is because they leave it to the efficiency of the civil sector to deliver planes and focus on their primary and constitutionally approved task of the air defense of the country.

In 1965 USA gifted the nation of Pakistan with one of greatest gifts that can be given to a nation. America helped create College of Aeronautical Engineering at Korangi that was modeled along the lines of US Air Force Institute of Technology. A wide variety of advanced tools ranging from super sonic and subsonic tunnels along with expensive electronics equipment was provided to PAF. The academic standard was maintained by sending American instructors and some inducted from the civilian sector. Despite these investments Pakistan has not designed a single locally designed aircraft as the engineers coming out of this institutions were primarily used for maintenance duties that does not even scratch the education imparted at this college. The graduates actually do very well when they go to the civil sectors and are found to be leading most of the companies and academia in engineering.  The PAF further eroded quality teachers when the college got moved to Risalpur for the sake of being close to pilot training institute. This is a lesson for US policy planners to learn before they give sophisticated assistance to the military sector. Had the college been given to the civil sector with the understanding that it would also allow limited military cadets to also participate, chances are that real aerospace engineering might have occurred and  the quality of education might have been maintained.

Pakistan has many companies that produce UAVs but PAF still buys Italian UAVs and Pakistani President still looks to the US to providing them.

These recent events should be a wake up call to Pakistan and its leadership to start making the right choices for protecting the Pakistani citizens from external and internal threats. The shape and scope of Pakistan’s needs must be reviewed and appropriate changes made correctly engage the civil sector to fulfill them.

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Core technologies and capabilities that drive the economies take a long time, large amounts of money and even bigger patience to bear fruit. But once they mature, the rewards are well worth the effort.  Malcolm Gladwell in his book “Outliers” makes a similar case for outstanding achievers, that it is more of their earlier start than their brains that make them excel. It is sustained practice of ones art or profession that over the period of time blossoms into an unsurpassed  ability.  Developing countries typically try to shy away from making investments in longer gestation technologies and therefore commit themselves to the path of perpetually playing catchup with developed countries. This is a story of a jet engine that propelled Air Forces possessing it into an unrivaled position.

J-79

In 1952, Gerhard Neumann, a German-born US-citizen, began development of what became one of the most successful military jet engines to enter production. The General Electric J79 was the first US single-shaft high performance axial flow turbojet, with adjustable guide vanes, a 17-stage compressor, three-stage turbine and ten can-type burners.  The first flight of the engine was on 20 May 1955 where the engine was placed in the bomb bay of a J47-powered B-45C . The J79 was lowered from the bomb bay and the four J47s were shut down leaving the B-45 flying on the single J79. The J79 was developed as an outgrowth of the General Electric J73 engine program and was known at first as the J73-GE-X24A. The X24A was designed for reliable Mach 2 performance with minimal required maintenance. Its innovative variable stator vanes increased compressor air pressure and helped eliminate compressor stall. Variable-incidence stators allowed the single-shaft turbojet to develop high pressures similar to those of dual-shaft engines, but at significantly lighter weight. The introduction of the variable stator vane turned out to be one of the most important developments in the history of jet aircraft engines.

More than 17,000 examples of the J79 were built in its thirty-year production run. In its long and successful career the dependable J79 accumulated well over 30 million flying hours and probably clocked more supersonic flying time than any other Western military aircraft engine produced during the Cold War. It was widely used on several types of aircraft, including the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, Convair B-58 Hustler, Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, Israeli Aircraft Industries Kfir, and North American Rockwell A-5 Vigilante. It was just over seventeen feet long, slightly more than three feet in diameter, weighed around 3,500 pounds, and produced around 9,000 pounds of dry thrust. In full afterburner the YJ79 generated around 15,000 pounds of thrust with a fuel flow rate of ten gallons per second. Later versions of the J79 weighed anywhere from 3,500 to 3,800 pounds and produced up to 17,900 pounds of thrust in full afterburner. This engine was chosen by Kelly Johnson to power his design of F-104 Starfighter.

Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson

Kelly Johnson joined Lockheed Corporation in 1933 as a tool designer. After assignments as flight test engineer, stress analyst, aero-dynamicist, weight engineer, and wind tunnel engineer, he became Chief Research Engineer in 1938. His original and creative thinking led to the development of many innovations in the aerospace industry. He contributed significantly to 40 different Lockheed airplane designs. Of these, 19 were primarily Johnson products, some of the best known aircraft in the world; the Hudson bomber, the Constellation and Super-Constellation transports, the P-38 fighter, the T-33 trainer, the F-94 interceptor, and the Jetstar. The first U.S. production jet, the F-80 Shooting Star which made its initial flight in 1944, set a pattern for Johnson and his co-workers. Managing Lockheed’s Advanced Development Projects Division (The “Skunk Works“), he developed the first double-sonic U.S. jet, the F-104 Starfighter, the high flying U-2 spy plane, and the super fast Mach 3 SR-71 Blackbird.

He was not only one of the world’s foremost designers, but he was an innovative manager who gave people who worked for him challenges to constantly create better products. Johnson instinctively knew how to select people for his organization. He knew how to get the most out of the fewest people and how to get the job done—well. He let his managers run their programs with a minimum of interference. As a man of high integrity himself, Johnson expected complete honesty from the people of the Skunk Works. Mistakes were allowed, but they were to be brought to his attention immediately. And Kelly also expected recommendations to correct mistakes. His early experience in metal machining acquired during summer jobs in auto plants proved invaluable in working the heat-resistant titanium sheets needed for the SR-71’s tough skin, which heats up to cherry red temperatures of 630° F. during flight. Johnson deplored the trend toward specialization with the lament of a designer who also knows how to handle machine tools. “Some of the fellows in the Skunk Works never had any cutting oil splashed on them.”

During the Korean Was, Lockheed whisked Johnson to war-zone forward air bases in Korea to talk to fighter pilots as they returned from their missions against the Soviet fighters flown by the north. What did they want in a new fighter aircraft? The answer was simple: speed and altitude. Appropriately, Johnson’s response was also simple. Build a pilot’s fighter which did not compromise on performance, one which could outmatch anything in the Soviet arsenal including the MiG-15.

F-104 StarFighter

The resulting design would carry one powerful, multi-barreled gun, a simple radar gun sight, a pair of the new heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles then under development for the US Navy, be powered by a single, potent engine and fly higher and faster than anything in service anywhere. What’s more, it would be affordable. Ultimate performance for the new fighter meant low drag and high power. Abandoning the swept-wing twin-engine concept of the Lockheed XF-90 which had been developed from the massive German research data captured by the Allies at the end of world war II, the Skunk Works team settled upon a straight wing of very slender section. Its exceedingly thin leading edge and minimum camber would decrease shock waves and give relief from the weight and complexity of swept wings. However, the wing would have to be considerably thinner than five per cent, and the only answer to producing such a thin, straight wing was to make it extremely short. It had incredibly small knife-edged wings, sharply drooped to improve stability, a long, needle-nosed fuselage, a tall “T” tail, and open, half-circle intakes behind the cockpit. It was so futuristic in appearance it was soon dubbed by the Lockheed marketing department, “the missile with a man in it”.

The shortness of the wing also enabled the aircraft to reduce drag. In order to achieve a better low speed performance for the wing, Lockheed engineers installed wing-leading edge as well as trailing-edge flaps. The function of these flaps was to convert the thin airfoil into a highly cambered one for better take-off and landing operations. A newly designed Boundary Layer Control System (BLCS) was installed of the F-104. The BLCS allowed the aircraft’s wings to delay flow separation at full flap setting and helped to increase the aircraft’s lift capacity, using high pressure bleed air blown over the trailing edge of the wing. The F-104 was one of the few aircraft in aviation history with more engine thrust than aerodynamic drag. This margin of thrust gave the F-104 it’s high speed capability and altitude performance. It also invested the aircraft with an uncanny ability to ascend at a steeper angle and with a higher climb rate than anything else in the skies. The climb rate was one of Johnson’s primary concerns in developing the Starfighter. He and his team designed the F-104 with the ability to intercept targets at an impressive climb rate of 60,000 ft per minute, with a fully loaded aircraft. This rate could be achieved with speeds in excess of Mach 1.7, the original profile requirement, without the aircraft losing overall forward speed. Overall speed and climb rate for the F-104 could only be achieved with the utilization of a massive power plant. The F-104 was fitted with a General Electric J79 engine capable of generating 15,800 pounds of thrust at sea level. It was a massive structure that weighed 3,500lb and was 17′-3″ in length. Due to the adjustable pitch of the guide vanes and its power, the howling noise of the jet engine was quite unique. The video link  below gives you a sense of its sheer power and speed.

Pakistan Air Force & F-104

When Khruschev threatened to drop a nuclear bomb on Peshawer after the U-2 incident, PAF acquired a dozen F-104s to protect the city from high flying Soviet bombers. At PAF’s request, all its F-104As were refitted with the M-61 Gatling 20   mm gun, whereas its counterparts in the USAF had been divested of their   guns on the assumption that all post-Korea air combat would occur at  high speeds where only the wing tip-mounted Sidewinder missiles would be   effective. The PAF’s foresight was amply rewarded in actual combat and   the USAF too reverted to having machine guns as mandatory equipment on all its fighters in due course. The newer GWE- J-79-11 engine was also   installed on the aircraft. This made the Pakistan F-104s somewhat   unique: they had the gun and being the lightest of F-104 series with a more advanced J-79 engine enjoyed the best thrust-to-weight ratio.

The only PAF unit to be equipped with the F-104 was No 9 Air Superiority Squadron. The squadron flies the F-16 today. The in-commission rate of   the F-104 during the first five years of service was over 80 % and all   its systems performed with high reliability. The fighter was employed in   the air-to-air role by the PAF and was used extensively for aerial gunnery against both banner targets and the Dart targets with excellent scores. In strafing attacks the M-61 gun was superbly accurate.

The F-104 Starfighters remained in service with Pakistan Air Force for twelve years and flew 11,690 hours. During the 1965 Pakistan-India War, the F-104s flew a total of 246 hours and 45 minutes while during the 1971 War, the F-104s flew a total of 103 hours and forty-five minutes.

My personal experience of watching the speed and sound of F-104 happened in the mid 60s when PAF provided an air display on Pakistan Day at Peshawar Air Base. Many of the jets were lined up on the airfield on a crisp cool morning. To demonstrate the high altitude intercept capability, an intruder B-57 was sent up first. After some other demonstrations it was announced that the intruder has been detected and two F-104 thundered near vertically off the run way. Soon after the contrails of the intruder and two much faster contrails of F-104s performing an intercept could be visibly seen by the awed spectators.

To give you a better feel for the performance of F-104s with PAF I have taken the liberty of attaching some extracts by

Wg Cdr Aftab Alam Khan, Pakistan Air Force (Retd)

Introduction

This is a personal account of the crucial role played by the dozen F-104 Starfighters of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in the Indo-Pakistan War of September 1965. The Indian Air Force (IAF) had then approximately 900 aircraft against PAF’s total of only 150. To win the battle for air superiority against these odds was a daunting task. Losing air superiority would have meant that Pakistan would have had to face the full might of the IAF, the consequences of which would have been disastrous. It was therefore imperative, that the PAF won and kept control of the air.

Induction of the Starfighter in the PAF

Sqn Ldr Sadruddin and Flt Lt Middlecoat landed the first Starfighters at PAF Base Sargodha in 1962. In the following months, Pakistan inducted a total of 10 F-104A and two dual seat F-104B training aircraft in No 9 Squadron. These were USAF F-104C aircraft refurbished and updated with the latest J-79-11A engine, and upward ejection seats. Equipped with the M-61 Vulcan six barrel gun, the AIM-9B Sidewinder missile and the AN/ASG-14T1 fire control system, the aircraft was designed for high altitude (above 5000 feet), day /night interception/combat. Pakistan was the first country in Asia to induct a Mach 2 aircraft into its airforce. While most countries in Europe were still flying subsonic aircraft and none in Asia had an aircraft of this class and technology, many in Pakistan and abroad were skeptical of the PAF’s ability to fly and maintain this advanced system. The PAF’s flying skills, technological prowess, and competence, were soon proven. The pilots and ground crew of No.9 Squadron, who had been handpicked from F-86 squadrons, became the envy of the PAF by gaining mastery of the aircraft. To be part of No.9 Squadron, the cream of the PAF, was a great honour and privilege. In 1964 I was lucky to be given this honor. Sqn Ldr Jamal A Khan, the Squadron Commander was a very dedicated officer who set and maintained high standards. Training and flying in this Squadron was hard work. Safety always came first.

The J-79-11A engine was sophisticated and complicated. It had inlet guide vanes in front of the engine, and a variable nozzle system in the rear. These were liable to fail, but the PAF maintenance crew had mastered the equipment. We only had one engine flame out, and the pilot Flt Lt Khalid managed to make a ‘dead stick’ landing. This was a difficult maneuver requiring precise judgement. The pattern was flown at 240kts and the landing flare started 300 ft above ground level, to make a touch down at 190 kt, on a 9000 feet long runway. Only one F-104 was lost during training -- a training air combat sortie -- in which Flt Lt Asghar ‘pitched up’, and went into a spin. He ejected safely at high speed, and received major bruises. The aircraft was replaced under the MAP program. Operational training was fun. Flying at Mach 2 was an incomparable experience. The thrill of coming under radar control, attacking F-86 formations, that were denied radar help, was a fighter pilot’s dream come true. The F-104 zoomed out of nowhere, and before the F-86 pilots could start their defensive maneuvers, the F-104 had completed its simulated missile launch and was breaking off.

Early in 1965, warlike activity started in the disputed territory of Indian held Kashmir. Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Nur Khan had taken command of the PAF, just before the war. These were the days when we would be briefed daily, ‘under no account should any IAF aircraft be pursued across the border, if an aircraft is shot down, the wreckage must fall within Pakistani territory’. This was done to ensure that India would not be provoked into escalating to an all out war. All the concentration was along the disputed territory of Kashmir. On 3rd September 1965 an IAF Gnat was flying over Pakistan, on its way to its home base. A lone F- 104 was vectored to intercept the aircraft. Closing in at supersonic speed, the F-104 crossed the Gnat. There was no chance of making a successful intercept. But the Gnat pilot, probably thinking that there were more aircraft in the area, promptly lowered his gears and landed at a disused Pakistani airfield below, and surrendered himself. At that time, few thought that there was any chance of a real war breaking out. Life went on as usual. The routine was that a daily morning Combat Air patrol (CAP) would be airborne well before dawn. The F-104 formation would climb to 30, 000 feet, patrol the area near Kashmir and land back one hour after sunrise.

The War

The balloon went up on the morning of 6th September 1965. I got airborne with my wingman on a CAP mission. We climbed out under radar control, and were directed to the border near Kashmir. I was informed that the IAF had crossed the Pakistani border and were attacking ground positions approximately 80nm south of us. This meant that India had actually decided to start an all out war. We were immediately vectored to the area, and were soon over the site where the Indian aircraft were attacking. While dawn was breaking at 15,000 feet, it was still dark down below. I asked for permission to descend to ground level, but was denied. The reason given was that radio contact would be lost. I, however, decided to descend and leaving my wingman at 15,000 feet, to act as radio relay, I dove down and headed towards some flashes. As I reached the area, I was surprised to see that I was flying head-on into a formation of four IAF Mystere IV aircraft that were attacking ground targets. I was shocked more than I was surprised, as I felt a wave of anger leap through me. I had to shoot down these aircraft. I jettisoned my external fuel tanks and started to engage the Mysteres, as they turned into me. Maneuvering started at tree top level. I kept my eyes ‘glued’ on the target. I could feel the strain, under high ‘G’s’, looking over the tail of the aircraft, keeping the enemy in sight, and skimming the trees at high speed. One mistake, and I would have hit the ground. If I had lost sight of the Mysteres, the fight would have been over. The F-104, with the afterburner blazing, at low altitude, was responding very well. I used the high speed take -off Flaps to improve the turning capability as required. The ‘Stick Shaker’ was a big help, in flying the aircraft to its limit. The Mysteres would have no problem keeping the F-104 in sight because of its afterburner. After some hectic maneuvering, I was positioned behind two aircraft, but the other two were still not visible. I then spotted them, further ahead. Joy leapt through me; I armed my weapons, and decided to shoot the first two with missiles and the next two with guns. I fully realized that a confidential order prohibited me from using the missiles below 10, 000 ft. However, I was sure the missiles could be used effectively at any height, provided the targets could be discriminated from background heat sources. A distinct increase in missile tone ensured this. I set the wingspan of the Mystere IV, and started to recall the missile-firing checklist. ‘Check Range’, ‘Check Tone’, ‘Check G’s’, ‘Squeeze the trigger and hold’. I aimed the missile at the nearest aircraft, and heard the loud pitched missile tone. The sight indicated that I was in range. With all other requisite firing conditions met, I squeezed the trigger, and kept it pressed. I waited, only to note that the missile had not fired. As I looked towards the left missile, I saw a big flash, and the missile leaving the aircraft. The missile had taken, as stipulated in the manual, approx. 8/10ths of a second to fire after the trigger had been pressed but in combat, this seemed like an eternity. The flash of the missile blinded me for a few seconds. The radar controller who was also monitoring the radio of the Mystere’s, immediately informed me that one Mystere had been shot down and that another had been damaged. I was then at once instructed to turn right and pick up visual contact with the other Mysteres, which were exiting. I turned as directed but could not see them.

On landing back, I was informed that the dog fight had taken place overhead the Rahwali Airfield where a low powered radar was located. The Mystere’s wreckage had fallen close by; the other three had gotten away. It gave me great satisfaction and amusement to think the effect that would be created on the IAF when the tale of the encounter with, ‘the F-104′ was narrated by the pilots who got away. To quote Hussaini, the PAF’s official aviation painter, ‘Apart from being the first encounter to start the war in earnest, the engagement was also significant in other respects. It marked a new era in dogfighting at very low altitude. It was also the first combat kill by any Mach 2 aircraft and the first missile kill for the Pakistan Air Force’. Moreover, it was also proven that the F-104 and the Sidewinder missile were an effective weapon system at low altitude.

India had launched a full-scale attack, and we were now at war. India had the advantage of the aggressor, but had failed to take advantage of the ‘first strike’. The PAF now had to counter attack. The Air Chief arrived on the base. As I saw him he looked confident, and very aggressive. He was a genius; his planning was only surpassed by his boldness in execution. He had to fight 900 Indian aircraft with his 150. What could he do? The odds were impossible. He immediately gave instructions to reconnoiter (recce) the forward IAF air bases of Halwara and Adampur with the F-104. The pilots returned to report that the airfields had a full compliment of aircraft. He then enquired how many aircraft were available for a ‘dusk attack’. He was told that only seven F-86’s were serviceable. He ordered four to attack the IAF Base of Adampur, and three to attack Halwara Air Base. The plan appeared absurd. Attacking an airfield with only four aircraft and three aircraft respectively, after a recce .The enemy would be waiting. The attack was sure to fail. Subordinate commanders tried to convince the Chief to withdraw the order. None of us could appreciate the reason behind his logic. Command is lonely, and it takes courage to stand by one’s convictions. The Chief stood firm. The ‘dusk attack’ was launched.

Of the seven PAF F-86 aircraft that took part in the ‘Dusk Strike’ two were shot down. The PAF kept attacking the IAF bases all night with B-57 bombers. The Air Chief hoped that the IAF would retaliate next morning, and attack the main PAF fighter base Sargodha that was 90 nm from the border. Radar was not effective at low altitude; therefore, the PAF had a string of Mobile Observer Units (MOU’s), that could plot and report low flying aircraft in Pakistani territory. Since the IAF attack was expected at low level, it would not be a surprise for the PAF. The only question now was, whether the IAF would take the bait, and attack Sargodha. Early next morning, on 7th September 1965, a large number of PAF F-104 and F-86 aircraft set up a Combat Air Patrol (CAP), over /near Sargodha, waiting for the enemy to attack. The F-104s were assigned the outer perimeter, while the F-86s were kept closer to the airfield. The Mobile Observer Units started to report the incoming intruders as they crossed the border and headed for Sargodha. The anti-aircraft guns opened fire as the first group of attacking aircraft came in. Surprisingly, these planes got through, without being intercepted. The next attack was picked up by Flt Lt Arif Iqbal in a F-104, and as he was about to fire, he suddenly saw an F- 86 flight appear between him and the enemy, and shoot down the Mystere. The attacks then came wave after wave, each one being intercepted, mostly by F-86’s, because they were positioned closer to the airfield. Flt Lt Amjad, in a F-104, shot down a Mystere, only to fly into the debris of the exploding aircraft. He ejected safely. By noon all attacks had ceased. The ‘Battle for Sargodha’ had been won. Never again in this war did the IAF venture to attack Sargodha in daytime. AVM Nur Khan had scored; the genius and courage of his plan had worked, his main air defence assets were safe.

The pilots of No.9 Squadron competed fiercely, to undertake as many combat missions as they could. Never missing a chance to close with the enemy, hungry for combat. In the days that followed, the F-104 pilots noted that whenever they got airborne, the IAF grounded all its aircraft. This made it very difficult for the F-104 pilots to engage the enemy during daytime hours. Flt Lt Mushtaq, my brother, flying a F-104 in the same Squadron, made contact with the enemy, only to note that as he approached the target, the IAF Hunters disengaged well in time. Flt Lt ‘Micky’ Abbas in an F-104 had a similar episode. This experience would be repeated for the F-104 pilots for all daytime interceptions. I personally patrolled in a lone F-104, at 30,000ft, deep inside Indian territory, over the two Indian fighter airfields of Adampur and Halwara for one hour, and there was no response from the Indian side, no IAF fighter aircraft were scrambled to engage the intruder leisurely loitering over Indian airbases. This was total air superiority, and it displayed the complete and utter supremacy the Starfighter enjoyed over the IAF.

At medium and high altitudes the F-104 ruled the sky. The IAF refused to challenge the Starfighter, keeping at a safe arm’s length distance from challenging it. But below 5000ft, a fierce battle raged between the F-86 and the IAF fighters, mainly the Hunters and Gnats. The F-86 was the workhorse of the PAF, it was under-powered, outnumbered, and out-gunned. Nevertheless, the F-86 pilots showed great courage as they fearlessly engaged their opponents, and displayed an unusual skill for air combat, achieving an excellent kill ratio. The F-104 by controlling the sky at medium and high altitude, had reduced the workload for the F-86 ’s to the extent that the disparity in numbers was manageable. The F-86’s could now hold their own against the enemy at low altitude. The F-104/F-86 team had won the battle for the air. The PAF had fully established air superiority. The job had been done; numbers did not matter now. The will of the enemy to fight the F-104 had been broken. It was a tremendous contribution by the F-104 in the war effort. The Starfighter reigned supreme. It had played a pivotal role in the defense of Pakistan, and the battle for air supremacy by the PAF.

Tribute to the Starfighter

Pakistan got the better of the IAF, with odds of 1:6 or 150:900, and the PAF maintained Air Superiority, day and night. The genius and courage of Air Marshal Nur Khan and the F-104/F-86 team had made this possible. Undoubtedly, the F-86 was the workhorse, but the F-104 had a very special task. The PAFpilot/F-104 team had created a situation where the IAF pilots did not have the will to fight the F-104. When the F-104 was ‘UP’, the Indian Air Force was ‘Down on the Ground’. This removed a major portion of the threat. The Starfighter and its pilots had contributed immensely to achieve this victory. The pilots by flying and engaging enemy aircraft very aggressively, never losing any opportunity to engage the enemy, by day or by night. Working long hours, and flying under difficult flight conditions. The maintenance crew and the F-104 deserve a special accolade, ‘not one technical abort, or snag affected a mission’. The F-104 was flown by determined pilots, maintained by efficient crew and supported by dedicated radar controllers. This made a tremendous team, that helped win the battle for air superiority for the PAF. The F-104 Starfighter was in a class of its own-’Superlative’, to say the least. Without the dozen Starfighters the outcome of the war might not have been so good. ‘It definitely was a pleasure, a great thrill, and the ultimate experience to fly the F-104 in Combat’.

The Engine is the Core Competence

The point of this longish post is the elucidate the importance of the core competency achieved by this amazing engine.  A dozen fighters equipped with this engine were able to dominate a much larger air force. While it is true that PAF pilots effectively mastered the art of flying a difficult plane and used it to its full potential, it can be argued that had IAF had this plane, they could equally well have had an upper hand.  Kelly Johnson was able to wrap a plane around this engine to create a master piece, that could even today give any fighter a run for the money with the right avionics and weapons upgrades at medium and high altitudes. But this engine proved equally effective in Phantom, a plane not designed by Kelly.

This lesson has been effectively applied by countries like Finland, Israel and Brazil. Finland has a disproportionate market share of cell phone market. Similarly Israel focused their investments in unmanned aircraft vehicles and are now reaping the benefits in this market of the future. Brazil competes on equal footing with US and European countries in the sales of business jets.

Developing countries like Pakistan should focus on core technologies of the future so that they too can compete with the best and reap the benefits.

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“Enemy pilots should see it, but never catch up with it.”
[MARCEL DASSAULT]
At the outbreak of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Mirage IIIEs were the newest and most advanced combat aircraft in the PAF inventory. Besides performing a wider variety of missions, they could generate a higher daily sortie rate compared to the aging F-86s, F-104s and B-57s. They could navigate accurately to relatively deeper targets and, after the attack, egress at high speed. They could carry out straight line, hit-and-run intercepts against raiders as adeptly as the F-104s, though the radar performance of both fighters was suspect against low-flying targets in ground clutter. Coupled with marginal performance of the five-odd low level AR-1 air defence radars which were interspersed with yawning gaps, PAF’s intercept capability was of consequence during day only; at night-time, it was a chance in a million, as it were.
Surface attack weaponry of the Mirage was not yet commensurate with the more capable platform that it was. PAF relied on the old vintage Mk-117 (750-lbs) high explosive bombs delivered from critical dive angles. Specialist anti-runway weapons had not been not been marketed by the French as yet. Air-to-air weapons included first generation AIM-9B Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles, whose two-degree wide field of view allowed only dead line astern attacks against backgrounds free of extraneous heat sources. Employment of the semi-active radar-guided Matra R-530 missile was found to be impractical in combat situations due to its stringent launch parameters and very short range, particularly at low level, where most of the interceptions were expected. It never saw operational use other than, what amounted to virtual jettisoning in one combat situation.
High expectations from these modern Mirages were also tempered by the stark reality of having just one squadron to fulfil the myriad tasks. 23 Mirages – one aircraft had been lost earlier in a flying accident – were a meagre 8% of the 276 combat aircraft available at the outbreak of war. How the PAF would dovetail its much vaunted front-line element into the military’s overall strategic reckoning had to be carefully articulated in its concept of air operations.

The Strategic Compulsion

Cognizant of the improbability of successfully holding its eastern wing against a determined Indian onslaught and a vigorous insurgency, Pakistani military planners came to be grounded in the conviction that ‘defence of the East lies in the West’. In practical terms, this aphorism meant that Pakistan would launch a major offensive into India from the western wing at the outset of any conflict. By threatening vital Indian assets in Kashmir and the Punjab, the Pakistan Army planners hoped to draw Indian forces away from the east and, gain enough time for outside powers to restrain an unmistakably rampant India. Additionally, any territory seized in the west could be offered as a sop to the countrymen for losses in East Pakistan.

NO 5 SQUADRON BEFORE THE 1971 WAR

PAF’s concept of operations gave over-riding priority to supporting the Army’s proposed offensive. Air cover was sought to be established over the Army’s deep thrust till such time that it had dug in and established its own defences. It was also felt necessary to attack 4-5 Indian airfields that directly threatened the offensive once it was underway. To prevent timely arrival of logistic reinforcements, PAF was to interdict supplies directly serving the Indian forces; this meant attacking rail yards and other supply nodes soon after start of the offensive. Until the army’s offensive was launched, limited close air support during holding operations was to be provided. Tactical recce was to be conducted regularly to determine the changing disposition of enemy formations. Finally, PAF was to maintain pressure on the IAF with sustained disruptive strikes against some of its forward and rear bases, to accrue a measure of psychological ascendancy in the conduct of air operations.
From PAF’s standpoint, it was easy to see that the modern Mirages were the weapon of choice for operations during the critical land battle planned for the western theatre. Yet, far from singling out these vital assets for the critical stage of the war only, it was boldly decided to employ them to the hilt in all phases.
The bulk of No 5 Squadron was deployed at its parent Base, Sargodha, under command of Wg Cdr Hakimullah, formerly an old hand on the F-104s. A detachment of six aircraft, led by Sqn Ldr Farooq F Khan, was moved to the deeper-located satellite Base of Mianwali to provide redundancy in the night intercept role and, also as a back-up strike element for the all-important land offensive. Mirages were thus poised to be at the forefront of PAF’s ‘coup de main’.

Softening Up
Contrary to the general perception, PAF’s dusk strikes of 3 December against some of the forward Indian airfields were not pre-emptory at all, as the Indian invasion of East Pakistan had already taken place in earnest, on 21 November. While these strikes were, of course, aimed at cratering runways and destroying radars, they also had an intrinsic ‘provocative’ element which the PAF planned to cleverly exploit through its well-prepared air defences, when IAF retaliated the following morning.
Mirages got a small share of 8 airfield strike sorties in the opening round of the counter-air operations campaign that also included 24 airfield strikes by F-86s and 4 radar strikes by F-104s. Wg Cdr Hakimullah led a flight of 4 Mirages to Amritsar, while his flight commander, Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam, led another flight of 4 Mirages to Pathankot.
Heading east into fast-fading light, Wg Cdr Hakimullah was able to take a cue from Amritsar runway lights, which were inexplicably glimmering when it should have been a complete black-out. His formation pulled up for a dive attack to deliver two 750-lb bombs each. Except for No 4, whose bombs did not release due to some malfunction, the rest were able to put in the attacks in the beginning of the runway.
Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam’s formation did not have the good fortune of catching Pathankot with its lights on and could not execute a proper attack in the evening haze and low light. The bombs fell in the general vicinity of the airfield.
Given the very short distance from the border, IAF was unable to scramble interceptors from the ground, so standing patrols should have been a sensible option. With no interceptors, all raiding aircraft came back unscathed. The disruptive raids were continued into the night by the B-57s.
The missed strike at Pathankot was repeated by Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam’s formation the next afternoon. This time, all the bombs found their mark on the runway and taxi track. As they were exiting after delivering the attack, Nos 3 and 4 found a Gnat closing in behind them, with guns blazing. Thanks to their swift Mirages, they were easily able to get out of harm’s way.
Mirages continued with the airfield strikes, flying for five more days. A mission each was flown on 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 December. Awantipura airfield was added to the usual list of Amritsar and Pathankot. Wg Cdr Hakimullah, alongwith attached senior squadron pilots, Sqn Ldr Rao Akhtar and Sqn Ldr Arif Manzoor alternated as mission leaders for these subsequent strikes. With the threat of enemy interceptors increasing, it was decided to add a pair of escorts during the airfield strikes.
Altogether, 38 strike sorties (including 8 escorts) were flown by Mirages against three forward airfields. This was almost one-fourth of the total daytime counter-air effort of 158 sorties flown by the PAF. As stated earlier, these airfield strikes were largely disruptive in nature and served the purpose of softening up, before the actual neutralisation that was to come later with the army’s offensive. Seen in that context, they do not seem measly in quantum, though where they fell short was in the ‘punch’. There is no reason to doubt the IAF assessment of the effects as “negligible/slight damage.” The runways were never out of operation for more than a few hours. The damage could have been longer lasting if special runway penetrating ordnance had been used, as the Israeli Air Force had done in 1967. Non-availability of such weapons led the PAF to resort to conventional iron bombs which would bounce off the runway and explode above the surface, causing more blast and less breach. Also, delivery from shallow dive angles to avoid exposure to Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) made the bombs skip off the surface even farther.
The disruptive raids seem well worth the effort, however, considering that operational and maintenance activity on IAF forward bases was hampered, and no PAF aircraft was lost while conducting these very dangerous missions. On a few occasions when enemy interceptors managed to get behind an odd Mirage, the latter was able to outpace them, much like Dassault had imagined in his desert vision of a mirage whereby, “enemy pilots should see it but never catch up with it!”

Defending the Skies

Despite a biggish nose which housed a sizeable antenna promising long range pick-up at higher altitudes, the Cyrano II radar of the Mirage lacked the ability to distinguish low flying targets against ground clutter. This drawback rendered the Mirage completely dependent on ground-controlled interception at low level, much like its spares-stricken counterpart, the F-104. PAF’s five low level ground radars could cover just 7% of the eastern border of West Pakistan and were, therefore, deployed at the main bases and a few vulnerable approaches only. Air defence was, thus, largely a function of Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) being able to respond to chance pick-up of low flying targets by ground radars. Once vectored on to its target by ground control, the Mirage could accelerate fast enough to chase an intruder for whom there was little hope of escape.
Naeem Atta, seen here as a Group Captain

The test of the Mirage’s capabilities as an interceptor came on the night of 4 December, when Flt Lt Naeem Atta was scrambled from Mianwali. The ground controller, Flt Lt Khalid Kashmiri, vectored Atta on to an intruder heading west, towards Mianwali. The controller was able to position the Mirage three miles astern of the low flying target, but in a pitch dark night, there was no prospect of visual contact. As the Salt Range loomed ahead, the target started climbing to avoid the hilly terrain. Fortuitously for Atta, this meant that the target was also easing out of ground clutter and there was a good probability that it would be ‘painted’ by the Cyrano radar. Unknown to Atta, his radar had been in standby mode, as he had not been careful in selecting his switches in a hurry; this was just as well, since the target’s tail warning receiver had not been triggered and there was no evasive manoeuvring. Soon after selecting the transmit mode, Atta was able to report a blip on his radar scope at an optimum IR-missile shooting distance of one-and-a-half mile, dead tail-on. Following radar lock-on, the missile’s seeker head swung to the heat source and, a growl in Atta’s earphones confirmed a launch-ready condition; the intruder’s fate was sealed. Moments after launching the AIM-9B Sidewinder, Atta saw a huge fireball silhouetting an aircraft in the night sky. Next morning, the wreckage of a Canberra (IF 916) was confirmed at the village of Nara located at the western edge of the Salt Range, not too far from Khushab town. The aircrew, including the pilot Flt Lt Lloyd Sasoon and navigator Flt Lt Ram Metharam Advani, belonging to the Agra-based Jet Bomber Conversion Unit, were killed on impact. The Canberra’s ‘Orange Putter’ tail warning system had been unwittingly outfoxed, in what turned out to be a classic, stealthy interception.
Flt Lt Safdar Mahmood

Not far from Mianwali is Sakesar, a small PAF Base perched on the picturesque Salt Range at an elevation of 4,000 feet. The Base housed a high-powered FPS-20 radar as well as the vital Sector Operations Centre – North. At mid-day on 5 December, the IAF had made an attempt at attacking the radar, which cost it dearly, as two Hunters were shot down by a patrolling pair of F-6s. Later that afternoon, a lone intrepid Hunter was able to sneak in for a successful rocketing attack. After the attack a clean getaway for a singleton, right under the noses of patrolling interceptors, was an improbable prospect. As expected, the Hunter was intercepted by two Mirages scrambled from Mianwali. The pair was led by Flt Lt Safdar Mahmood, with Flg Off Sohail Hameed as his wingman. Diving down from the hills, the Hunter had built up speed, but not enough to elude the far swifter Mirages. With the help of instructions from the ground controller, Flt Lt Shaukat Jamil, Safdar was able to catch up and settle behind the Hunter, to start his shooting drill. A couple of well-placed bursts of the 30-mm cannon got the Hunter smoking. As Safdar held off while watching his quarry in its last throes, Sohail picked up the smouldering aircraft and let off a Sidewinder missile to finish it off. Just before the aircraft impacted the ground, the pilot ejected but it was too late. Sqn Ldr Jal Maneksha Mistry of No 20 Squadron was found fatally injured. The wreckage of the Hunter (A 1014) was strewn near the small town of Kattha Saghral.
Chamb was one of the few sectors where Pak Army had made significant advances and the Indian XV Corps desperately sought destruction of heavy guns that had been reported in the area. On 6 December, a pair of Su-7s from Adampur-based No 101 Sqn was tasked to locate and destroy the guns. The Su-7s sought out what appeared like hutments concealing the artillery pieces and were rocketing the place.

Flt Lt Salimuddin Awan

Flt Lt Salimuddin Awan and his wingman Flt Lt Riazuddin Shaikh, who were patrolling in their Mirages over Gujranwala-Sheikhupura area, were vectored by ground radar onto the two Su-7s. Salimuddin, who was carrying a R-530 radar-guided missile alongwith two Sidewinders, decided to get rid of the bulky weapon by just blindly firing it off, so as to lighten up for the chase. Spotting the Mirages, the Su-7s jettisoned their drop tanks and rocket pods and started exiting east. With the Su-7s doing full speed, a long chase ensued till Riazuddin found himself close enough to fire a missile, but it went straight into the ground. Salimuddin then moved in and, on hearing the lock-on growl, pressed the missile launch button, not once but twice, to be sure. Two Sidewinder missiles shot off from the rails and, moments later, Riazuddin called out that one of the Su-7s had been hit. Salimuddin instantly switched to the other Su-7 and fired his 30-mm cannon. Just then, Salimuddin noted the outlines of Madhopur Headworks near Pathankot, which was not surprising, as they had been chasing the Su-7s for several minutes inside enemy territory, along the Jammu-Kathua Road. Recollecting themselves, the Mirages turned back and recovered at Sargodha with precariously low fuel. Monitoring of VHF radio confirmed a message transmitted to Adampur that an Su-7 had been “fired at … the pilot ejected”. It was later learnt that the wingman, Flt Lt Vijay Kumar Wahi had succumbed to his ejection injuries. The leader, Sqn Ldr Ashok Shinde, was lucky to bring back his Su-7 which had been damaged by bullet hits. High-speed pursuit was a forte of the Mirage, a lesson learnt by the IAF the hard way and, one time too late.
Mirages flew a total of 315 air defence sorties (219 during day, 96 at night) which was 18% of the overall air defence effort. With three IAF aircraft shot down, the Mirage kill rate, based on the total air defence sorties flown, came to be .95%. This compares quite favourably with kill rates of other PAF fighters which performed air defence missions: F-86F -1.2%, F-86E -1.1% and F-6 – 0.74%.

Scouting the Troops

PAF had three Mirage IIIRs, which were equipped with five OMERA Type 31 optical cameras mounted in the nose. With a Doppler navigation radar available, getting to a destination was fairly easy. Magnesium flares provided enough illumination at night to confer a round-the-clock tactical reconnaissance capability. The number of aircraft was, however, on the low side and did not sufficiently cater for unserviceabilities.
A month prior to the outbreak of all-out war, the PAF had started to fly cross-border photo recce sorties, some of which were in the vital Chamb Sector, where the Pak Army’s 23 Division had planned a secondary ‘diversionary’ offensive. With the disposition of forces well-known, the attack resulted in significant advances that threatened India’s overland links to Kashmir, besides depriving Indian forces from establishing a launch pad for offensive operations towards the vital lines of communication passing through nearby Gujrat.
Early in the war, another important breakthrough came in the Suleimanki-Fazilka Sector, where 105 Independent Infantry Brigade (IV Corps) was able to surprise the Indian ‘Foxtrot’ Force and, made a firm foothold in the area of Pak II Corps’ planned main offensive. While the Indian forces desperately carried out repeated counter attacks, PAF Mirages conducted regular photo recce missions in Ferozepur area to update the ground commanders about Indian reinforcement efforts aimed at vacating the incursion. In the event, a badly demoralised and confused Foxtrot Force could not make any headway and the Pakistani brigade was able to safeguard the vital Suleimanki Headworks, which was only a mile from the border.
In preparation for the main offensive, PAF Mirages fervently conducted photo recce missions along Ferozepur-Kot Kapura, Ferozepur-Fazilka and Fazilka-Muktasar railway networks, as well as in general areas of Ferozepur and Sri Ganganagar, for the latest disposition of forces. An important mission involved recce of crossing points over Gang Canal for a careful scrutiny of obstacles across the waterway that could possibly impede the movement of II Corps. The main offensive could, however, not materialise as explained later, and most of the photo recce effort was rendered worthless.

Two pilots who played a sterling role in the photo recce operations were the squadron’s ‘slide rule wizards’, Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar and Flt Lt Najib Akhtar. Of the 30 photo recce sorties (besides 15 escorts) flown by No 5 Squadron before and during the war, 22 were considered successful. Although most of the singleton recce Mirages were escorted by another Mirage, yet some of the missions had to be aborted due to intense enemy air activity. In Shakargarh Sector, a few night recce missions were attempted with partial success. In one such mission on the night of 11 December, an IAF MiG-21 scrambled to intercept a Mirage flown by Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar, ended up shooting down one of its own MiG-21s flown by Flt Lt A B Dhavle, which was patrolling in the vicinity.
Four-odd Bomb Damage Assessment missions were also flown following the initial strikes on runways. These helped in better planning of subsequent airfield strike missions.

Interdiction of Supplies

One of the hugely successful missions of the war was an attack on Mukerian Railway Station. On 15 December, Wg Cdr Hakimullah was tasked to lead a four-ship mission to attack Bhangala Railway Station on Jalandhar-Pathankot railway line. After pulling up for the attack, he was dismayed to discover that there was no rolling stock in sight, but he decided to try his luck further south along the railway line. Having flown a mere 30 seconds, he overflew Mukerian Railway Station which was bustling with trains. Peeling off into the attack pattern, the four Mirages set themselves for single-pass dive attacks with two 750-lb bombs each. According to Hakimullah’s estimate, there were at least 100 freight bogies latched to different trains berthed adjacent to each other. The Mirages released their bombs one by one though No 4, who had hung ordnance, pulled off dry. The impact of the bombs on fuel and ammunition laden trains was so furious that the blasts shook the aircraft; No 2’s drop tanks sheared off with the shock wave but he was able to fly back without any further damage.
The Mirages had so far been striking at shallow targets, but with the time for the main offensive running out, it was decided to use them more audaciously. It was ironic that one of the most significant interdiction missions was also the one and only flown by Mirages, before the curtain fell two days later. 

Drop Scene

Pakistan Army’s plan in the west called for the beginning of offensive operations five or six days after an Indian attack in the east. These, however, were meant to be secondary operations, essentially distractions, designed to fix the enemy and to divert his attention away from the intended site of the main attack by II Corps. With one armoured and two infantry divisions, II Corps was to strike into India from the Bahawalnagar area approximately three days after the secondary attacks. II Corps was to drive east to cross the international border, before turning to the northeast to push for Bhatinda and wishfully, beyond. It was expected that most of India’s armoured reserves would have become embroiled in Pakistan’s defences in the Shakargarh salient during this three-day interval between the secondary attacks and the main effort.
After much prodding by the Army’s field formation commanders as well as the PAF C-in-C, the vacillating GHQ reluctantly issued orders for II Corps to shift to its forward assembly areas on 14 December; elements of 1 Armoured Division began to move the following day. By this time, however, the other major component of II Corps ie, 33 Division, had already been detached to reinforce the beleaguered I Corps in the north and 18 Division in the south, where things were not going well for the Pakistan Army. As a consequence, II Corps was deprived of almost one third of its striking power before the offensive had even begun. On the evening of 16 December, however, new instructions arrived from GHQ, “freezing all movements” until further notice. Following capitulation of forces in the Eastern Wing, Pakistan accepted a cease fire on 17 December.
Mirages – which were expected to reduce the IAF’s weight of attack by neutralising 4-5 IAF airfields once the main offensive was underway – could, thus, not be utilised for the critical task that had been meticulously planned for months.

Report Card

During the 14-day war, Mirages flew a total of 393 sorties which was 13% of PAF’s overall war effort of 2,921 sorties. For a relatively new and modern weapon system, the the Mirage could have achieved an aircraft Utilisation Rate better than the 1.6 sorties per aircraft per day during the war. While it fell short of the planned 2.2 daily sorties, it reflected a cautious conduct of the war whereby the PAF was held back, so that everything could be thrown in during the army’s main offensive which, in the event, never came through.
Wg Cdr Hakimullah, who very ably commanded the Mirage squadron during the war and, also led several dangerous missions in enemy territory, was awarded the Sitara-i-Jur’at (Star of Valour). That coveted award also went to Sqn Ldr Farooq Umar, the senior flight commander of the squadron, who had flown many useful photo recce missions in enemy areas infested with patrolling fighters. The three pilots who shot down IAF aircraft were content with having joined the elite club of fighter pilots with aerial kills.
A month after the war, the PAF was able to line up 22 Mirages for all to see on the tarmac at Sargodha, while the 23rd Mirage was under maintenance in a hangar. The impressive sight belied claims of any losses that had been incurred by the Mirage fleet during the war.

Air/Cmdre Kaiser has had the opportunity of flying several classic fighters including F-6 (MiG-19), F-7P (MiG-21 variant), F-7PG (MiG-21 double-delta variant), Mirage-5, Mirage F-1E and the venerable F-16 Fighting Falcon. He commanded a fighter squadron, a fighter wing and PAF’s largest fighter Base at Masroor. When out of the cockpit, he found time to pursue literary activities. ‘Great Air Battles of Pakistan Air Force‘, a book written by him, is a manifestation of his interest in aviation history. He also writes for various military journals and newspapers. He retired as an Air Commodore in 2005, after thirty memorable years of service.

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Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognize China in 1950 and the third non communist state. Pakistan then voted for a bill concerning the restoration of China’s legitimate rights in the UN. PIA became the first non-communist airline to fly into China in 1964.

All Eggs in One Basket

The real transformation came when USA cut off all spares and other support such as training courses etc. both to India and Pakistan on breakout of 1965 Indo-Pak War. It did not hurt India much as they were mostly dependent on USSR. It had a few US transport twin piston-engine C-118 Packets with a third jet engine specially positioned on top of fuselage. It was specially designed for operations from high altitude airfields such as Leh, after Indo-China War of 1962. (As a POW we flew in one from Calcutta to Nagpur on way to our camp at Jabbalpur. Aircraft was in a rickety dilapidated shape due to poor maintenance).This sudden cutting off of support effected Pakistan very adversely.  PAF very significantly effected as it had all her eggs in one (US ) basket. After partition, PAF had acquired first 60 Sea Fury fighters in1950, then followed by 12 jet Attackers from UK. In addition, for transportation, PAF replaced 8 odd C-47 Dakotas with (110 yes 110 ) British Bristol Freighters. We needed at the most 12 transport aircraft, but our RAF CinC bought 110 of them. We got a raw deal from Britishers in  Attacker and Freighter sales inter alia many others – thanks to RAF CinC and other senior seconded RAF officers. Pakistan could only afford these small numbers with its own honest money. After joining  CENTO and SEATO PAF went whole hog for better US aircraft, acquiring 100 F-86s, 12 F-104s, approx 10 B-57s, 12 or so C-130s, and number of search and rescue helicopters and amphibians.

Mauripur Base in the 50s. Click on it to enlarge.

“These picture shows most of the newly acquired US planes. I was there with my newly raised 16 Squadron ( Motto as suggested by late Group Captain Mahmood (Edu) ‘ tendrust o tenumend  o drusht zee”. As you would observe, the birds are clean without drops. Nur Khan led the fly-past of ninety six clean F86s, taking off from old short 040 runway, climbing to 35,000 feet. From there diving and streaking over city at high speed 1,500 feet high. Luckily no bird hit even though the area was infested with them. Some pilots had very few hours on F86s; No 16 Squadron had then Pilot Officers late Akhtar (Air Commodore, Comdt Staff College) and P/O Riaz (Heli pilot later) who had only 5 hours or so on the type. 96 aircrafts lined up for take off on short 04, at 98 % power crammed up together was not a joke. Recovery was even more remarkable as the runway was not only short but it had at the end a 2 feet high lip of main runway 27 under construction.“

US Embargo Dilemma

Faced with this dilemma due to US embargo, PAF frantically looked around for replacements, but nothing was available soon and within our means. Though most of our top brass including President Ayub Khan, under the influence and over-awed by the West, had to eat the crow and beg China to help. For example, Chinese PM Chou En Lai, with his far sightedness first offered the construction of Karakoram Highway in1962. Pakistan turned it down lest USA got annoyed. Air Marshal Asghar Khan was sent to Peking during the War for immediate procurement of the aircraft and for the Chinese double barreled, very effective, 12.5 mm Ack Ack guns. Chinese PM graciously and promptly agreed to meet our request with the proviso that FM Ayub Khan will have to personally make the request. This he did soon after the war towards end of September. He visited Peking meekishly and very secretly lest USA got peeved.  On advice from our Foreign Office, dominated by Brown Sahibs, Air Marshal Asghar suggested to Chou En Lai that these aircraft may be crated and secretly shipped to Jakarta, and from there to Karachi. Thus giving the impression to West that, just like Indonesian Submarines, these aircraft too have been obtained from there. It was an immature, time consuming and childish proposal.

Premier Chou-En-Lai

“One of the worlds greatest person PM Chou En Lai having exclusive lunch with our Ambassador M Sultan Khan and his wife Abida in the Embassy (Embassy is where Ambassadors live , Chancery is their office which is mistakenly called Embassy ) Occasion being the visit of M Shahabuddin, brother of first Pakistani PM Nazimuddin,( ex Chief Minister of combined Bengal pre-partition. He was a very honest but simple man who left little assets. His wife was living in a small house in some remote Karachi Colony till 1980 when Gen Zia allotted her some decent house.)  Shahabuddin then was probably Speaker of Parliament.”

Chou En Lai immediately shot it down and said that these will be made available at airbase like Hotian. It will be very easy to ferry them across to Pakistan from there. During this meeting Chinese PM enquired from AM as to how long it will take PAF pilots to achieve the necessary proficiency. Asghar Khan replied that our pilots are experienced aviators; they would not take more than 10 to 15 days. Remarkably PM disagreed and said that unlike your planes, these are equipped with metric systems, have configurations different from Western aircraft, and most of all there would be language problems. He thus opined it would require 6 to 8 weeks for transition. And it took that much. To highlight this, it took our pilots nearly one week to understand that switches on panels on right side of cockpit are in fact ‘circuit breakers’ and not switches as these appeared to be.  China provided initially sixty F-6 aircraft along with tanks, arms and ordinance for 3 Army Divisons, large number of AA guns and ammunition etc..

Pakistani Air and Military Attaches with Chinese Military Leaders

And it was done almost free of cost and within days. One point always bothered the Chinese. China following policy of conservation, objected to our scales of ammunition. They said we follow American pattern of firing to frighten where as we should fire to kill. This reminds me, once in 1962 at PAF Naltar attending Ski Course we 5 or 6 Wing Commanders went for Chakor shikar. We fired about two dozen cartridges but could not kill a single bird. Next day one local bearer took 4 cartridges, in the evening he brought 3 chakors and returned one unused cartridge. When we inquired, he said they approach bird behind a colorful shield and fired only after reaching it close,

First batch of PAF pilots reached China in early Oct’65, where they were stationed sixty miles south of Tientsin Harbour. Base facilities were spartan but clean. Accommodation and food was prepared under Muslim requirements. They flew about 10 to 15 missions each on F-6, Chinese built Mig-19 aircraft. As stated earlier, China then made all efforts to conserve. F-6s. They were thus fully covered and protected from sun and dust. They were taken close to beginning of runway; covers were removed at the last moment and mission accomplished from thereon. Protective measures were undertaken immediately after landing. Not a single fault occurred during training of the two batches of six pilots each, except one malfunctioning of a gauge. This was remarkable achievement. Life style was simple. The airfield was about a mile away from the residential area. When one of our pilots had hairline crack of ankle, he was provided with a cycle, otherwise every one walked.

Air Marshal Nur Khan’s Visit

CinC PAF Air Marshal Nur Khan paid two visits to China during my tenure as Air Attache at Peking. The first one was in Nov’65 and second in Dec’67.

AM Nur Khan with Premier Chou En Lai

The above picture was taken during first visit , when he was accompanied by AVM Qadir, Air Cdre Z A Chaudhry, Air Cdre Khawaja Maint, my course mate Grp Capt S H Shah, Grp Capt Khawaja Supply and Group Capt Mustafa. Embassy is represented by Minister Durrani (in grey suit in front row) and First Secy Yunus next to me behind Minister Durrani.  Normally PM Chou En Lai did not meet Military Chiefs, but he had liking for Nur Khan and thus graciously had dinner with him followed by this photograph.

The visit was to review the progress of procurement of aircraft, tanks and other equipment. It also included a visit to the air base where our pilots were undergoing. Aircraft unserviceability was zero, Base workshop produced most of the spare parts themselves despite  the fact that their workshops were not as well equipped as ours, according to Air Cdre Khawaja, ACAS Maint. They were remarkably self sufficient in every thing including food, vegetables, etc.

F-6 Aircraft

Newly Minted F-6s arriving in Pakistan

F-6 had good power weight ratio of 86 %, giving it a lot of kick and maneuverability even at high altitude. But it was not a perfect aircraft. A serious problem faced in these aircraft was turbine buckets melting away or detaching and piercing through the other engine or pipes causing it afire. This was due to poor Russian metallurgy. Engines required change of the turbine buckets after every 100 hours. This was in contrast to an F104 engine requiring Inspection and Replacement if required (IRAN) after 1200 hours. PAF installed British Martin Baker ejection seats amongst many other changes. Maintenance wise F-6 was a labor intensive aircraft when compared to US aircraft. Latter having modular systems which are expensive but efficient. F-6 was not pilot friendly aircraft in an emergency and cost us many lives.

On the whole, however, the F-6 was a great acquisition considering that these were provided promptly at a crucial juncture; when we were against the wall and not being able to fill the requirement from any other source. To top it off these were almost free of cost, thanks to the Chinese government and in particular PM Chou En Lai. They have thus earned our gratitude, goodwill and trust, despite our leader’s penchant for the West.

Multi Faceted Relationship

The efforts put in to developing an exemplary relationship by people of both countries in those days, has paid dividends across the board. We now have collaboration in both civil and defense industries. The Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port are two mega projects that have the potential to transform the social landscape. While there are many lessons to derive from the experience, there are some that truly stand out.

Lessons To Learn

The first lesson is never to put all our key assets at the mercy of any one country. Despite our experience after 1965 we still tried to buy US F-16s and even paid for many of them, only to see their delivery embargoed and money not returned. In contrast the collaboration on JF-17 and other projects with the Chinese have borne fruit. Becoming self sufficient in essential items is a lesson to learn from the Chinese.

The other important lesson is to lead a simple life style and live within ones means. China when it became independent was in much worse shape than Pakistan. Chinese have shown that by living simply and focusing on important things, with correct priorities, they can achieve wonders. We can better protect our interests and sovereignty if we avoid dependence on aid and learn to stand on our feet. Is it too much to ask?

The author was commissioned in 5^th GD(P) Course in 1949 and has the unique honour of winning the coveted Sword of Honour, Best Pilot Trophy and Ground Subjects Trophy. He later raised and commanded No 16 Squadron (F-86F), two fighter Wings (No 32 Fighter Ground Attack Wing and No 33 Fighter Ground Attack Wing). Served as  the first  Air Attache in Peking China after 1965 war. He commanded two Bases, viz PAF Base Peshawar and PAF Base Dacca. At the latter Base, he was also AOC East Pakistan during 1971. He was appointed as ACAS (Ops) after repatriation as a POW. His last appointment within PAF was as  first Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command. Following that, in 1976 he was appointed as the  first DG JS in the newly established JCSC Headquarters.  In 1979 he was inducted in th Federal Cabinet, from where he resigned and retired from PAFin 1982. He is the recipient of the second highest military award, Hilal-e-Juraat.

Editor’s Note: I am thankful to the author for sharing pictures from his personal collection with the public.

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The US embargo on military sales to Pakistan at the outbreak of 1965 Indo-Pak War was received with dismay and disbelief by the PAF, whose combat and training aircraft were totally of US origin. Already starting to get outclassed by more modern aircraft, the F-86Fs, F-104s and B-57s were now plagued by spares support problems that rendered them virtually worthless in the PAF. The C-in-C of the PAF, Air Marshal Nur Khan who had cannily led the force during the war, sensed the criticality of the situation and started an immediate search for suitable aircraft from new sources. Unfortunately for Pakistan, geopolitical realities restricted most available options. Pakistan’s CENTO and SEATO memberships hardly endeared her to the Soviets. The Indians had already made inroads to Moscow and the first shipment of six MiG-21s had made its operational debut during the 1965 War. The Soviets saw India not only as a socialist ideologue that could be helped militarily, but as its influential proxy and mouthpiece in the Non-Aligned Movement. The prospect of Soviets and Pakistanis developing any kind of patron-client linkage, thus, came to be a non-starter.

China, in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, had not shown much interest in developing newer aircraft technologies for the time being. Content with the copy of Soviet-supplied MiG-19s, China mass-produced this single-role fighter in thousands. When Pakistan approached China for military help in 1966, she was only too glad to offer the F-6 as a token of friendship, the initial batch of 60 being free of cost. Though limited in range, speed and weapons payload, PAF inducted the aircraft and assigned it the day interceptor role with a secondary close air support task, which it dutifully went on to perform over the next 36 years.

A Quirky Fighter

The MiG-19 (Mikoyan and Gurevich) was the first supersonic fighter of the Soviet-bloc, making its prototype debut in late 1953; it was contemporaneous with the North American F-100 Super Sabre, the first supersonic fighter of the West. The MiG-19 sported audaciously swept-back wings which, at 55 degrees, were considered the right answer to drag rise during high speed flight, but were also problematic at low speeds due to the lower lift-generating ability of such wings. Designers increased wing thickness to ensure enough lift at low speeds, but more lift meant more drag in another form. Two powerful afterburning RD-9B turbojet engines pushed the aircraft out of this jumble and gave it a respectable status of a transonic fighter which could race through to a top speed of Mach 1.3. A set of three hard-hitting 30-mm cannon and, in later versions, two first-generation K-13 heat-seeking missiles completed the weapons suite as the Soviet bloc’s frontline missile-armed interceptor.1 (PAF modified the aircraft to carry AIM-9B Sidewinder missiles.) The same set of cannon armed with armour-piercing bullets, along with two rocket pods, served a useful secondary close air support role. Pilots discovered that they could manoeuvre the aircraft with abandon as long as their speed was not below 500 kph and, they could effortlessly chase their prey if the speed was not above 1,000 kph. Outside these limits lay severe testing grounds requiring special nerves and lots of muscle.

Ready for War

PAF pilots did not take long to master the quirky complexities of the F-6 at the limits of its flight envelope. They often relished the no-holds-barred dogfights with Mirages and Starfighters which could easily be out-turned, if not out-run, in dissimilar air combat. F-6 pilots boasted of some of the best gunnery and rocketry scores in the PAF. Operationally, the pilots seemed pleased to get so much out of so less, as it were. Maintenance of the aircraft was, however marred by a very low time-between-failure of components, as well as a low time-between-overhaul of the aircraft and engine. This was something that the engineers and technicians were able to overcome only when the PAF set up its own F-6 Rebuild Factory at Kamra in 1980 and, rapid overhauls became possible. At the outbreak of the war, PAF had 90 F-6 on its inventory, but due to these maintenance issues, a mere 48 were available for operations.

The F-6s were distributed amongst Nos 11, 23 and 25 Squadrons, each with 16 aircraft. No 11 Squadron, based at Sargodha, was commanded by Wg Cdr Sikandar M Khan. No 23 Squadron, the first Unit to be equipped with the F-6 in early 1966, was commanded by Wg Cdr S M H Hashmi; it had moved from its parent base Sargodha to the forward base at Risalewala, which formed the first tier of air defence against intruders from the east. No 25 Squadron, commanded by Wg Cdr Sa’ad A Hatmi, was split into two detachments of eight aircraft each, based at Sargodha and Mianwali. At the latter base, the detachment had the somewhat unconvincing task of guarding the ‘back-up’ strike assets including 10 B-57 and 5-odd Mirage IIIE for the all-important phase of Army’s main offensive.

Defending the Skies

Air defence cover in West Pakistan was patchy at best, but at low level it had wide gaps and only 7% of the border had radar coverage. Raid reporting by the few rear-located low level radars was not expected to provide enough reaction time for a ground scramble. Similarly, reporting by mobile observers – which is based on visual or aural information – was likely to cause delays. An expedient solution was to mount combat air patrols over possible enemy ingress routes, round the clock, effort permitting. Wasteful though it was, it was decided to man several points in the air and all fighters were ordered up for this task. F-6 came to be the workhorse for day air defense in the northern region.

The morning of 4 December promised action as the IAF was expected to retaliate in response to PAF’s strikes against some of the Indian airfields the previous evening. The PAF was ready, with fighters continuously patrolling the skies since first light. No 23 Squadron pilots at Risalewala had been tidily scheduled for the day’s proceedings. Around 0930 hrs, as F-6s for the day’s sixth mission were taxiing out of their pens, an air raid warning was sounded. A mission abort was ordered and loudspeakers relayed instructions for everyone to take cover. Flt Lt Javed Latif who was on cockpit standby, started to unstrap from his F-6 for a quick egress. Momentarily glancing out of the pen opening to see what was going on, he was aghast to see a Su-7 diving down straight at his aircraft. “The scary sight of an intake pointing at me is still etched fresh in my memory,” recalls Latif. As he jumped out of his F-6 to take cover, a salvo of rockets landed smack on the pen.3 Still scampering towards a trench, Latif was rattled by cannon fire from the second Su-7 as the bullets landed a few yards away. Then the raid was over as suddenly as it had started, and the AAA died down too, as if heralding an all-clear. Dusting himself and recovering his composure, Latif rushed to his pen to help put out the fire caught by the hessian camouflage covering. Luckily, his F-6 was unharmed except for a few nicks from slivers of falling plaster. “I was seething with anger at having been violated thus, and hurried to strap up again to settle the score,” remembers Latif. Shortly thereafter, a scramble was ordered for the next pair but confusion reigned as the taxi way had been blocked by the F-6s of the previous aborted mission. This led to yet another abort at a critical time but the situation was salvaged when Latif, who was standing by for a later mission, took charge and hit the starter button on his own. Just as he was taxiing out, his crew chief came rushing towards the aircraft, signalling for a switch off as another air raid warning had been notified. “My mind was racing and I had already decided in a split of a second – I was going to take my chances flying and I was not going to repeat the fiasco of the last pair,” Latif recollects. Over-ruling the Air Traffic Control’s somewhat confused recall message, Latif checked if his No 2 was also taxiing out. Hearing no response, he decided to take-off alone. Changing over to the radar frequency, he heard an eager voice wanting to join up as his wingman. It was Flt Lt Riffat Munir on patrol from the fifth mission, whose leader had aborted due to a technical problem. The new partners were only too glad to find themselves as a viable combat entity again. It wasn’t long before the ground radar handed the pair over to ‘Killer Control,’ a cleverly-perched look-out tasked to visually guide the interceptors about the raiders’ position with the help of geographic landmarks. Flt Lt Ahmed Khattak’s confident voice called out that two Su-7s were pulling up for an attack from the north-westerly direction and pointed out their position over the main water tank. After jettisoning their drop tanks and charging their guns, Latif and Riffat confirmed visual contact with both Su-7s. As the attackers approached the airfield, Latif easily positioned behind one of them while Riffat cleared tails. Firing all three of his cannon, Latif waited for some fireworks. Noticing that the aircraft was still flying unharmed, he fired another long burst till all his ammunition was exhausted. Just as he was expecting his quarry to blow up, he felt a huge thud. Thinking that he had been hit by the other Su-7, he broke right and then reversed left but found no one in the rear quarters. Checking for damage, he found that the left missile was not there and the launcher was shattered. The AAA shells bursting in puffs all around the airfield confirmed his suspicion that he had taken a ‘friendly’ hit, but luckily the aircraft was fully under control. Pressing on, he started to look for the escaping Su-7s and within moments, was able to pick one of them trailing a streak of whitish smoke. Convinced that it was the same one he had hit earlier and, assuming it to be crippled, Latif decided to go for the other Su-7. He spotted it straight ahead, flying over the tree tops at a distance of two miles. Engaging afterburners, he closed in for a Sidewinder shot but could not get a lock-on tone. To his dismay, he realised that the missile tone was routed through the circuitry of the left missile which had been shot off. Getting below the Su-7, he fired without a tone nonetheless, half expecting it to connect, if at all it fired. Moments later, he heard Riffat’s excited voice on the radio, “Good shooting, leader, you got him!” Not sure if he had really hit him as he had not seen any explosion, Latif was soon relieved to see the Su-7 roll over inverted and hit the ground.4 Flt Lt Harvinder Singh of Halwara-based No 222 Squadron went down with his aircraft near Rurala Railway Station. Riffat’s chase of the second Su-7 (flown by the mission leader, Sqn Ldr B S Raje) had to be cut short as he was getting low on fuel and his leader was out of ammunition. No 23 Squadron had drawn first blood after an eventful morning that saw Latif doggedly in business after surviving rocket and AAA hits. For his heroics on the ground and in the air, Latif was awarded a Tamgha-i-Jur’at (Medal of Valour).

25 Sqn at Mianwali

Shortly before sunset on the same day, Sakesar radar reported a raid heading towards Mianwali. Sqn Ldr Ehsan and Flg Off Qazi Javed of No 25 Squadron, who were on ‘cockpit standby’ in the hessian-covered pens, started their F-6s and within minutes, were taxiing out for take-off. Just then, Javed reported seeing two Hunters pull up for an attack. Sensing that they had been caught on the ground at the wrong time, Ehsan decided on a hasty take-off and pushed up the throttles to execute a sharp turn on to the runway. Unfortunately, use of excessive power caused him to veer off into the ‘kutcha.’ Stuck in the mud, he became an unwitting spectator as the Hunters delivered their attacks. In the meantime, Javed decided to take-off without his leader. Just as he lined up, he saw the lead Hunter strafing way far to the left of the runway. With half his worries suddenly over, Javed started rolling but danger from the second Hunter remained, as it had all the time to aim carefully and take a hearty shot. Anxious, Javed craned his neck back only to see the Hunter’s cannon blazing at him. “I thought his dive was too shallow and, at the close distance he was, the bullets would overshoot,” Javed recalls his rather masterly prediction. Mercifully, the bullets did land 200 feet ahead and towards the left, so Javed continued his take-off. Once airborne, keeping the Hunter in sight was a problem in the fast-fading light. Speeding at 900 kph, Javed remembered that he had not jettisoned his drop tanks. When he did get rid of them at such a high speed, he induced a porpoise but was somehow able to ride it out. Charging in at 1,100 kph, he had closed in to about a mile and a half, which was just the right range for a Sidewinder shot. He fired his first missile and when he did not see it connect, fired the second one. That too went into the ground. “All this while the Hunter pilot seemed totally oblivious of what was going on and his leader was nowhere in sight, so I gleefully decided to press on for a gun attack,” says Javed. “Since things had been happening too fast, I had forgotten to charge my guns after take-off. Having done that, I first fired with my centre gun till all its ammunition was spent.5 With the Hunter still flying unharmed, I decided to continue firing with the side guns. After a few frustrating bursts, I closed in to about 1,000 ft and fired a real lengthy one. Luckily, the last few bullets of the volley struck the right wing as I noticed a flash. The aircraft pitched up and rolled over to the right. I only learnt of the pilot’s ejection later, as I had to break away to avoid overshooting the out-of-control Hunter.” The aircraft fell about 14 nautical miles north-east of Mianwali. Flg Off Vidyadhar Chati of the Pathankot-based No 27 Squadron, when interrogated about the circumstances of his shooting down, said he suspected he had been brought down by ground fire! Duck shoot it was, over the idyllic Khabbaki Lake, but Chati should have known better where the bullets really came from. Ironically, the pilots of No 27 Squadron who had been declared the ‘Top Guns’ of IAF’s Western Air Command during a gunnery meet prior to the war, had failed to shoot up the conspicuously exposed F-6s on the runway. For the rookie Javed, who was freshly out of operational training on the F-6, remaining cool under fire was a most worthy achievement and he deservedly won a Sitara-i-Jur’at (Star of Valour) for his daring deed. F-6s over Sakesar

The high-powered FPS-20 radar at Sakesar, had received considerable attention f the war. Shortly after mid-day on 5 December, aron was again able to sneak in and attack the rand cannon. Patrolling nearby, over the picturesque Salt Range, were two F-6s of No 25 Squadron flown by Wg Cdr Sa’ad Hatmi and Flt Lt Shahid Raza. They were immediately vectored by the radar towards the exiting Hunters but it was a while before Hatmi spotted the pair. As the Hunters sped away over the hilly terrain, Hatmi wisely decided not to waste his missiles in the unfavourable background clutter. Using his guns instead, he made short work of one of the Hunters which fell 15 miles east of Sakesar. The pilot, Flg Off Kishan Lal Malkani, was killed. Next, Flt Lt Shahid Raza, who had all along kept the second Hunter in sight, closed in and opened fire with his guns which found their mark. The pilot, Flt. Lt Gurdev Singh Rai, who was the leader of the mission had twice visited Sakesar on the previous day, ran out of luck this time. He met his end when his Hunter crashed near the small town of Katha Saghral at the foothills of Salt Range.

On the afternoon of 8 December, two patrolling F-6s of No 23 Squadron flown by Wg Cdr S M H Hashmi and Flt Lt Afzal Jamal Siddiqui were vectored on to two Su-7s, just as they were exiting after attacking Risalewala airfield. Hashmi caught up with one of the pair, about ten miles east of the airfield, and let off a Sidewinder. The missile homed on unmistakably and the Su-7 exploded above the tree-tops; the pilot was not seen to eject. The remains of Flt Lt Ramesh Gulabrao Kadam6 were later discovered around the wreckage near the small town of Khalsapur. Hashmi immediately started looking for the other Su-7 and, to be sure of his No 2’s safety, called out for his position. Afzal replied but the transmission was garbled, which Hashmi interpreted as his No 2 being visual with him and, assumed that he was somewhere in the rear quarters. Just then Hashmi picked contact with the second aircraft and did not think twice before launching a missile. If there was any difference between the similar-looking planforms of the Su-7 and F-6, this was surely one time to have had a closer look. His No 2 was nowhere in sight and his frantic unanswered calls to Afzal seemed to confirm Hashmi’s worst fear. Had he mixed up his quarry in the murky winter haze? Afzal, who was chasing the second Su-7 at high speed and had ended up ahead of his leader, was not able to clearly convey his position on a broken radio. Hashmi, an otherwise unflappable squadron commander, should have known better, for he had been too eager for the second kill which unfortunately ended up as a horrific fatality for his wingman.

On one occasion the F-6 was completely outwitted by a Su-7. Flt Lt S S Malhotra of No 32 Squadron, who was on a photo recce mission over Risalewala on 13 December, spotted a patrolling F-6 and took a pot shot before exiting. It was only later that Malhotra learnt of Flt Lt Ejazuddin’s ejection over his home Base.

F-6s flew a total of 674 day air defence sorties (including 42 sorties over the battle area) which was 40% of PAF’s day air defence effort. Five enemy aircraft were downed during the air defence missions, or a kill rate of 0.74% in the role of an air defence fighter. All interceptions took place after the raiders had released their weapons on their targets, which was a reflection of the inadequacy of the air defence system that had been unable to provide sufficient early warning. The saving grace was the ability of the powerful F-6 to accelerate fast and nab the escaping raiders.

Over the Battlefield

PAF’s concept of air support to the land forces was biased towards direct support (close air support, armed recce and battlefield interdiction), as it was seen to yield immediate results in the ongoing battle. Indirect support in the form of deep interdiction beyond the battlefield was considered an exercise wrought with uncertainties in a short war, as the severance of the supply chain was likely to take some time before it showed its effects on a well-stocked front. The F-6 fitted well into the scheme of direct support as its powerful 3×30-mm cannon were ideal for strafing of convoys and rolling stock during armed recce, while two pods holding 8×57-mm rockets8 each, offered the option of firing a salvo in the midst of an armour concentration.

F-6s found their calling in Shakargarh sector, where the Indians had launched a two-pronged offensive with two infantry divisions along with two armoured brigades, while a third division was deployed in a defensive role. Against this force was Pakistan Army’s beleaguered 8 Infantry Division trying to fight off the massive onslaught, while 8 Armoured Brigade, staunchly but unsuccessfully, tried to launch a belated counter-attack. This sector saw PAF intervening in great force, with the bulk of air support missions flown for 8 Division. F-6s flew all but 9 of their 141 close air support and armed recce sorties9 in this sector but, regrettably, the mission success was very low; almost half the sorties were wasted as no enemy activity was observed in the area of interest. Hazy winter conditions as well as abundance of natural camouflage and dense habitation contributed majorly to the problem. While it must have been very frustrating for the pilots not to find the ‘armor concentrations’ that the tasking orders promised, they more than made up whenever they stumbled upon them.

An exciting situation developed in one of the close air support missions on the morning of 7 December, when four F-6s of No 11 Squadron found themselves vying for airspace with four Su-7s, which also happened to be on a similar mission near akargarh salient. The moment the Su-7s sighted the F-6s pulling , they lit afterburners and started to exit eastwards. At that time the No 2 called that he had been hit by AAA so he was asked by the mission leader, Flt Lt Atiq Sufi, to pair up with No 4 and recover back. Atiq then smartly ordered a split, so that two F-6s were chasing a pair of Su-7s each. “I remember accelerating to 1,100 kph despite the rocket pods which were retained, as I could not afford to take my eyes off the prey to look inside for the selective jettison switches,” says Atiq. He barely managed to arrest his rate of closure and opened fire on his target with the centre gun. “I had expended the ammunition in the centre gun so I switched to the two side guns and continued firing. A well-aimed volley struck right behind the cockpit and the Su-7 rolled over its back,” remembers Atiq. It was later learnt that Sqn Ldr Jiwa Singh, the senior flight commander of Adampur-based No 26 Squadron had gone down with the aircraft, south-west of Samba just over the border. The F-6 deputy leader, Flt Lt Mus’haf Mir also fired at one of the fast-receding Su-7s but it was lucky to have accelerated away, apparently unscathed.

A brief scrap took place between ‘relatives’ of the MiG family on 14 December when three F-6s of No 11 Squadron, which were on an armed recce mission in Shakargarh area, sighted four patrolling MiG-21s. Flt Lt Aamer Sharief manouvred behind one of the trailing aircraft and fired a Sidewinder. The outcome of has remained moot as the engagement took place in enemy-controlled territory and, no further details of the wreckage or pilot status have emerged ever since. PAF lost two F-6s to ground fire during the tactical air support campaign. Flt Lt Wajid Ali Khan of No 11 Squadron was shot down by AAA near Marala Headworks on 7 December; he ejected but ended up as a POW after being picked up by Indian troops which were in the vicinity. The other casualty was Flt Lt Shahid Raza of No 25 Squadron who was shot down by AAA near Shakargarh on 17 December, the last day of the war; he was heard to be ejecting in enemy fate remained unclear. He was awarded a Tamgha-i-Jur’at for devotion to duty, as well as professionalism shown in his earlier Hunter kill.

141 sorties of close air support by the F-6 were a mere 20% of PAF’s daytime tactical air support effort, with the bulk flown by F-86E & F. Considering the eminent suitability of the F-6 for the task, a larger share could have been more advantageous. The F-6 detachment at Mianwali could not help, as it was too far removed from the battle scene; it belatedly flew into Sargodha for air support duties a day before the war ended. Nonetheless, a total of 33 tanks, 42 vehicles and 4 guns were claimed by F-6 pilots in the 80 sorties that were considered successful. It can be seen that this was a useful contribution by the F-6 squadrons to 8 Divisions’s efforts in stemming the offensive in Shakargarh salient.

Report Card

During the 14-day war, the F-6s flew a total of 823 sorties which was 28% of PAF’s overall war effort of 2,919 sorties. For a relatively new weapon system, the F-6 could have achieved an aircraft Utilisation Rate better than the 1.6 sorties per aircraft per day during the war. While it fell short of the planned 2.2 sorties daily, it reflected a cautious conduct of the war, whereby the PAF was held back army’s main offensive which, in the event, never came through.

Besides the individual gallantry awards won by F-6 pilots, Nos 23 and No 25 Squadron were awarded Squadron Colours for distinguished performance during the war. The battle honours are as much a tribute to the F-6 as its spirited pilots, who forged this spartan aircraft into one of PAF’s most robust and dependable war machines.

Bio of A/C Kaiser Tufail:

He has had the opportunity of flying several classic fighters including F-6 (MiG-19), F-7P (MiG-21 variant), F-7PG (MiG-21 double-delta variant), Mirage-5, Mirage F-1E and the venerable F-16 Fighting Falcon. He commanded a fighter squadron, a fighter wing and PAF’s largest fighter Base at Masroor. When out of the cockpit, he found time to pursue literary activities. ‘Great Air Battles of Pakistan Air Force‘, a book written by him, is a manifestation of his interest in aviation history. He also writes for various military journals and newspapers. He retired as an Air Commodore in 2005, after thirty memorable years of service.

Addendum:

by Imran H. Khan

F-6 provided PAF engineers with the first airborne platform that they could experiment with freely. They did so in both the mechanical and electronic areas. Adding the Gondola to increase the flight duration was one of the most visible modifications. Addition of sidewinder was another major weapons upgrade that was an unlikely marriage of US and Chinese technologies.

Chuck Yeager wrote the following about this in his book.

“One of my first jobs there was to help them put U.S. Sidewinders on their Chinese MiGs, which were 1.6 Mach twin-engine airplanes that carried three thirty-millimeter canons. Our government furnished them with the rails for Sidewinders. They bought the missiles and all the checkout equipment that went with them, and it was one helluva interesting experience watching their electricians wiring up American missiles on a Chinese MiG.”

In my brief tenure in the PAF I had the opportunity to install a piece of ECCM equipment on the F-6. What struck me was the lack of process in conducting such a modification on this type of plane, when compared with others.  The plane that I modified was  a flying breadboard with all sorts of modifications. PAF engineers performed some 140 modifications.  Sometimes in our rightful glorification of the pilots who put their lives on the line, we forget the contributions of the technicians and NCOs in keeping these planes flying. I have in all my interactions been impressed by the dedication of the maintenance staff. These modifications led to F-6s playing an active role much later than in other air forces that flew it.  PAF trained over 1,000 fighter pilots and flew over 400,000 sorties on this aircraft. It retired after thirty years of active service  in 2002.  Not bad for a plane that flew originally in 1954.

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Pakistan has been blessed with many amazing women whose stories have been largely untold. Shahla Haeri wrote about some of them involved in the social sphere in her book “No Shame for the Sun“. OPEN’s chapters have also held conferences and forums highlighting the role of Pakistani American women in the US. In the recent years three Pakistani women have defied all odds and achieved remarkable success in achieving some of the highest goals typically associated with men. These achievements are specially significant taking into account their economic and geographic origins.

Maria Toor: Pakistani Woman Squash champion from South Waziristan

Maria is the Pakistan Woman Squash champion and Seventy Second in the World. What is remarkable is that she comes from WANA South Waziristan, the home of Pakistani Taleban. Her parents are from a poor background and she did not even pick up a squash racket till the age of twelve. Her meteoric rise in squash is amazing as she has achieved this with little to no resources. In listening to her in the attached video you can get a sense of her passion for the game and the hurdles she had to overcome in order to get there. The other thing that struck me was her confidence in achieving pretty much what she put her mind to, including appearing in a Hollywood movie. With little to no education she has still found the time to learn English and appears comfortable in front of the camera.

Saira Amin: First female Sword of Honor Winner and Fighter Pilot from Peshawer

Saira not only graduated from one of the most rigorous air force academies in 2006, but also won the most coveted Sword of Honor. To achieve this you need to be the most outstanding cadet in all of the three areas of flying, academics and general military training. She belonged to only the second group of females to be inducted into the PAF. She had to outclass all her male colleagues in physically grueling training that included para jumping.

She has established that in a extremely male dominated domain of jet fighter pilots of one of the most demanding of air forces, a female can not only participate but even dominate.

The video below shows female fighter pilots converting into flying fighters of PAF.

Naseem Akhter: Fastest Woman in South Asia from Korangi.

Naseem Akhter caught the fancy of all of Pakistan when she beat Pramila Priyadarshan, the Sri Lankan favorite to win the gold medal in South Asian games in 2010. She hails from a poor family from Korangi area of Karachi. Her dedication to achieve her goal was captured in her statement that she gave after the event.

“I had forgotten the world for six months and trained really very, very hard under my coach Maqsood Ahmed to achieve this. It is a great moment for me to have brought glory to the country in my event.”

To grasp the real significance of her story you have to watch the video below and see and hear the pride of her family.

What really struck me in the photo below is that she was wearing loose clothes and yet was only a second and half behind the fastest woman on the planet, Florence Griffith-Joyner. I can only wonder that with some training and more streamlined clothes what she can possibly achieve.

The theme that runs common in all the three stories is that none of these ladies let any excuse come between them and their goals. They managed the challenges with a supportive family structure. They exhibit all the same qualities that are needed to be a successful entrepreneur. They had to raise money, market their talents, fight the naysayers and excel in what they did with single minded focus.

To all these women, “Afreen” .

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President Yahya Khan held fair and free elections in December, 1970 in which Awami League of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman won a majority largely due to his Six-Point manifesto. National Assembly was to hold its first session in Dacca on 2^nd March, 1971. It was, however, sabotaged by vested interests of West Pakistani establishment and some leading politicians, who were not willing to accept a Bengali-led government. Postponement of National Assembly strengthened the secessionist movement in East Pakistan, duly supported by India. Violent civil disobedience ensued through out East Pakistan immediately, resulting in casualties including death of students in a Dacca hostel due to shelling.  Army was forced to retreat to cantonments for avoiding bloodshed. The situation was bad demanding careful and intelligent handling. After about a week, when the disobedience had simmered down, Yahya and advisors reached Dacca and held final talks with Mujib on around 20^th March for a couple of days. It was then agreed that Yahya will retain the Presidency and, honouring the outcome of election, he will transfer power to Mujib. Yahya, vacillating as ever, swayed by the ill-advice of leading politicians of West Pakistan and his own military junta, to ‘sort out these bloody Bengalis’,  resorted to use force  in starting on 25^th March, 1971, instead of  implementing  political solution as reached with Awami League – a complete betrayal of trust.

After the war, the Government of Pakistan established a Commission headed by Chief Justice of  Supreme Court of Pakistan Mr Hamood-ur-Rahman with just and truly needed Terms of Reference to look into political, economic, social, administrative, bureaucratic, military, etc, causes and factors which led to the debacle. Later, the government of the day and civil establishment, apprehending incrimination, restricted the Terms of Reference and confined these to only the military factors, thus making armed forces the scapegoat for all the misdeeds of past and present rulers, political leaders and the establishment.  Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission (HRC) gave their verdict on East Pakistan debacle in 1974, but the report was never shown to us who underwent interrogation. Some years ago, “Declassified portions of HRC report  – text 28” published by DAWN on February 4, 2001 dealing with the role of PN and PAF, which came to my notice recently. A few statements therein needed clarification.  In this saga, inter alia, I have given the rationale of some of our actions which fell short of HRC approval.

Grim Backdrop

On 30^th March, 1971 when I was posted to GHQ as Director Joint Warfare and concurrently, as the first PAF Directing Staff of National Defence College, I was asked at midday to report immediately to the C-in-C PAF, Air Marshal A Rahim Khan, at Peshawar. An aircraft was provided which promptly flew me there. The C-in-C gave me a letter addressed to Air Commodore M Z Masud (though known as Mitty Masud but I will call him MZ), Air Officer Commanding, East Pakistan and Base Commander Dacca, asking him to hand over both commands to me immediately as he (MZ) was not in favour of military action and was seen to be not fully cooperating with the Army. This was evidently told to Rahim Khan by the Generals returning from Dacca.

I returned to Rawalpindi and left by the evening, reaching Dacca next morning by PIA routed via Colombo. Immediately, I went to MZ’s office and performed the most painful and unpleasant task of handing over the C-in-C’s letter. ‘Painful and unpleasant’ because MZ was and probably, has been, the most brilliant planner and professional commander ever produced by PAF, who very ably led the air battle from Sargodha in 1965 War. I had the highest regards and respect for him.

Needless to say that he was shocked and surprised at this unexpected order. MZ had given a presentation to Yahya and others on 16^th March, a copy of which he had sent to Rahim Khan for approval, prior to the presentation. The conclusion was that military action was not the proper solution to the crisis in East Pakistan. Rahim Khan fully approved the draft and the presentation was made. Yahya made some ambiguous remarks at the end. General Rao Farman, on coming out of hall, said to MZ, “You have said what we could not say.”

According to MZ, when the civil disobedience started early in the month, according to orders, all Bengalis were removed from vital installations and West Pakistanis, mostly aircraft technicians were put on guard duties. A day or two after military action, General Tikka Khan rang up MZ shortly before sunset and asked for air support for a besieged army unit. MZ replied that all his technicians were on guard duties and it would take him a while to collect them and have the aircraft prepared.  He said that it would be dark by then and air support not possible that night, but from next dawn onwards, the army could have all the air support needed. To this Tikka retorted “Masud, I know that PAF can launch fighters within a couple of minutes. You are dragging your feet and not co-operating since you have been against the military action to start with.” MZ attempted to explain how scrambles within a few minutes are done when pilots and ground crew are ready on standby duties. This technicality was, however, beyond the comprehension of General Tikka.

I must hasten to add that Tikka Khan was a kind-hearted gentleman, most concerned about the welfare of troops. Far from being a ‘butcher of Bangladesh’, he applied minimum of force in operations and insisted on causing a minimum of collateral casualties – quite contrary to policy of his successor.  Only once I saw him losing his cool when, during an evening meeting, he was insisting upon securing the bridge and the radio station in downtown Sylhet. This was opposed by all the four or five Generals present, who wanted limited troops there to secure the airfield where the reinforcement could be flown in. This peeved Tikka Khan.

PAF’s Plight

Normally for intercepting enemy air raids before they reach the target, early warning is needed to scramble (launch) interceptors which are on standby. For high altitude raids, normal radars with long range coverage provide this vital information. But in our environment, attackers fly mostly at low altitude.  Till then, the PAF had not been able to acquire any mobile low level radar system. The old WW2 method of early warning was, therefore adopted.  In UK, retired military personnel living along the eastern coast were enrolled to do the job. They were given basic aircraft recognition and familiarization training, provided with phone and/or RT, binoculars etc. Their sole job was to inform the Air Defence Centre about any aircraft intruding into own airspace flying at low level. Extra information as to approximate number of raiders, type or name of fighter or bomber, direction of their flight, etc was a bonus. In Pakistan we did not have such civilian personnel available along the border. Hence Mobile Observers Units (MOUs), comprising of a jeep manned by three active servicemen, trained similarly as UK observers, for reporting intruder/s at low level to Control Sector, were established. A string of these Units was deployed just inside our border, about five miles apart from each other. In West Pakistan, as a longer run-in had to be made by intruders for most of our targets, a second string of MOUs was deployed about 25 miles behind the first string.  Report from the first string, followed by a report from the second enabled the Control Centre to compute and determine the intended target and the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) of attacker over target. This gave time to Bases to scramble interceptors and engage the enemy before they reached the target. In 1965, at dawn on 6^th September, it was, in fact, one of such MOUs which first observed and reported Indian tanks rolling towards Lahore for a surprise attack.

East Pakistan had 1,400 miles of border, but we had only a limited number of MOUs. The Units were deployed five miles apart and close to the border towards north and east of Dacca, these being the likely approaches of low level raiders. When the civil disobedience started early March and insurgency commenced in earnest,  Mukti Bahini started killing our vulnerable soldiers and other West Pakistanis, in cities and around cantonments, wherever they could lay their hands on them. MOUs being dispersed in hostile surroundings were, thus, sitting ducks for the insurgents. MZ ordered their withdrawal back to Dacca. Only a few could return, while others were massacred as happened in Mymensingh Sector. There, Flight Lieutenant Safi Mustafa, an able pilot and good professional (and newly married), was the MOU Squadron Commander. He collected his troops (about 20 or so in number) but they were overwhelmed by large number of Mukti Bahini. They arrested the MOU personnel and put them in an underground cell of the Civil Jail at Mymensingh. When the military action started on 26^th March, all these helpless men were massacred in cold blood, becoming victim of hatred of Bengalis towards the West Pakistanis. I visited the Jail later and found etching and writing, etc on the walls. It was a very moving experience, even when recollected today. I called the Superintendent of the Jail to my office. He cried and said that Mukti Bahini outnumbered his staff and he was helpless in saving the MOU personnel. At the end he said something very odd: “Hindu blood still runs in our veins”.

Initially, for high level raids we had a Russian P-35 radar with a height finder but it was withdrawn to West Pakistan in October to improve radar coverage there. After all, the war strategy clearly articulated: ”Defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan.” This left us with only fixed low level radar, well-sited near Dacca at  Mirpur, with excellent foliage camouflage. Indian Air Force could never locate it. This radar could see up to only 20 to 25 miles – thus providing just over three minutes warning of an approaching fighter bomber at 420 knots. As for the height of attacker, in the absence of a height-finder radar, we assumed that they would come at low level, which they luckily did, thus enabling our fighters to spot them.

The share of East Pakistan was only one F-86E (Canadair CL-13 Sabre Mk-6) Squadron of 12 aircraft with same number of pilots, though the Unit Establishment was for 16 aircraft. Bengalis had been taken off from flying duties. There was however one Bengali pilot  in the Squadron whose background was known to me at Peshawar, when he was undergoing fighter conversion and I was the Base Commander. I was shocked to learn from him that he got his education in Shillong, India. Since there was no Cadet College in East Pakistan, most Bengali youth went to Shillong or Darjeeling for good education. Taking a calculated risk I cleared him to fly combat missions which he did admirably. Accompanying other pilots he came to Pakistan where he rose to the rank of Air Vice Marshal, including a tenure as Air Attaché in UK.

Army on Shaky Grounds

On assuming command on 31 March, 1971, I provided all the air support asked by Pak Army, which was pivotal in achieving success in most operations. Pak Army was fully satisfied with the air support and no complaint was ever heard (except for the very first one on start of military  action  late in the evening on 26^th March, 1971).  An example  of how effective we were, is that of the highly successful army operations at Feni, north of Chittagong, which were possible with full air support.  During this period of  early April 1971, Army units kept on pouring in from West Pakistan by PIA, flying around Sri Lanka.  PIA Boeings were faster and had a quick turn around. These troops arriving Dacca had only their rifles with them, leaving behind weapons such as machine guns, mortars, etc. They had no training, whatsoever, in jungle or guerilla warfare. They were ill-dressed for the terrain of East Pakistan. Instead of gum boots  or ammunition shoes, they had only the cheap brown Bata canvas shoes, which might have been suitable for PT but not for jungle warfare. They had only light parkas to protect them from incessant rain. One had to see the gear of Indian soldiers, what with gumboots, proper leather shoes, rain-coats, etc. We felt sorry for the plight of our soldiers. On reaching Dacca, they were immediately rushed to far-flung posts strung along the border, in a strange, hostile environment. Another major contrast between Pakistani and Indian soldiers were the educational disparity. All Indian soldiers could read and write Hindustani, while some of the NCOs were fluent in English. On the other hand, some of our havildars were without the ability to read even Urdu.

The situation in East Pakistan remained adrift throughout summer, with minor skirmishes with Mukti Bahini, and a few cases of bombing/blasting railway line, bridges, etc.  PAF continued with air support and rescuing troops whenever they were in a fix. A PAF C-130 transport airplane stayed in Dacca for the first two months, rushing troops where ever needed in an emergency, operating most professionally from remote strips.

GOC, Eastern Command, General Niazi remained busy telling dirty jokes to any and every one coming his way. He once visited our standby hut at Dacca airfield from where interceptors are launched at short notice. Seeing the GOC, aircraft technicians assembled around him.  Without appreciating the propriety of the occasion or discipline of PAF, he embarrassed me by relating a very filthy joke to airmen. His conduct and deportment, leaving aside his professional acumen, was not very complimentary to the promotion system  of the Army.

Pak Army continued the defence of fixed posts all along the border till the very end. The GHQ in Rawalpindi was giving false hopes to our Eastern elements and, we constantly heard of silly reports of ‘reinforcements by Yellows from North and Whites from South (aircraft carrier)’. War Orders for forces in East Pakistan had clearly stipulated gradual retreat to Dacca Bowl on opening of hostilities. This was totally ignored, which might have helped a better outcome, as will be shown later. This policy of holding onto the posts along the border  resulted in considerable casualties to our troops.

Nobody Listening

In 1971, during my couple of visits to West Pakistan, it was shocking to see a life of fun and frolic at parties, totally oblivious of the war-like situation of their brotherly Wing. The adage that ‘a General has to feel the heat of battle for proper decisions’ was meaningless, given the distance between the two wings which was warping a correct appreciation of the situation and thereby, decisions. This distance of 1,000 miles across India was further multiplied three times due to via-Colombo routing after over flights had been denied by India, following a self-staged hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft.

By third week of April, Mukti Bahini insurgency was almost routed, providing an opportunity to resolve the issue politically – the only method to keep Pakistan intact, to some extent. In the third week a high level delegation visited Peking. On return they stopped at Dacca. Our Foreign Secretary Mr Sultan Muhammad Khan was a member of this team. I knew him from China where he was our Ambassador in 1966-68 and I was the Air Attaché. I met and told him that a breather is available for serious resolution of the issue. He replied “Bhai wahan (meaning Yahya and his coterie) to koi  sunta he nahi aisi (logical) baat”.

The Government  did appoint a helpless Governor Malik, without any authority; it was just a smoke screen for a political solution, a very difficult issue requiring hard decisions. The situation kept on drifting with no decisive act by Pakistan in sight. On the other hand, Indians were seriously preparing for war, along with full diplomatic propaganda about a large number of Bengali refugees in India, atrocities by Pak Army in East Pakistan etc. They were concurrently giving training, arming Mukti Bahini and launching military actions against us. With dry weather suitable for military offensive approaching in Bengal, Mrs Gandhi Prime Minister of India was itching and looking for an excuse to attack.

In November, a mission comprising of the Services Chiefs and led by Chairman  PPP Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Peking. The Foreign Secretary S M Khan, being an old China hand, was also a member of the team. On its return, the team briefed President Yahya Khan but excluded Sultan Muhammad Khan. In 1974, on my return to Pakistan from a POW Camp at Jubbulpur in India, I met S M Khan and asked him about the team’s visit to China just before the war. He related that Prime Minister Mr Chou En Lai met the team at dinner.  According to Mr Khan, Mr Chou En Lai continued the whole night with his analysis of world opinion regarding the developing situation in the Sub-Continent, especially with respect to Indian aims. This meeting continued till the morning, when Mr Chou said he will discuss the matter with Chairman Mao Tse Tung and meet the team again at dinner. In the evening Mr Chou En Lai further elaborated all the related factors and, by morning he summed it up in a brief gist. Mr Chou, in his arguments and analysis, made some what of a pyramid of these from ground upwards, ending up at the apex with a concise plan of action. For our team it was: DO NOT PRECIPITATE WAR AS THE WORLD OPINION IS TURNING AGAINST INDIA. IF NECESSARY TRADE TERRITORY FOR TIME.

Being a civilized person, he formally added at the end, total friendship and support for people of Pakistan. The leader of Pakistani team offered no words of thanks or gratitude. Being an ex-China hand and seasoned diplomat, S M Khan took upon himself to thank the PM for his very apt and useful advice. Sooner they came out of meeting, Bhutto rebuked him for thanking the Prime Minister for advice, and said  “Sultan, what do these Chinese know of Indo Pakistan affairs.” S M Khan said at once that he was not sure as to what message will be conveyed to Yahya Khan.  When I enquired from S M Khan as to what message was actually conveyed to President Yahya from this last China trip, he said that he was not taken to the Presidency, but General Peerzada was present in the briefing to the President and I could ask him. This I did,  who confirmed that Bhutto only conveyed  general remarks of Mr Chou En Lai about friendship and support for people of Pakistan; the specific advice for not precipitating war was intentionally not conveyed. Clearly, the PPP leader had his own agenda, which he could not achieve in 1965.

PAF Braves it Out

On 21^st November, 1971, a flight of our four F-86s was providing air support just west of Jessore, well within own territory,  but without any radar cover which was not available there. They were intercepted by IAF Gnat aircraft, and two of our fighters were shot down. The pilots ejected safely but on landing they were handed over to Indians by unfriendly East Pakistanis.  Flying over East Pakistan was as if you were over enemy territory. No directive or intimation about the imminent war was conveyed to us from Rawalpindi, though we were to bear the main brunt. Indians knew about it well before PAF’s pre-emptive dusk attack on IAF airfields adjacent to West Pakistan. An hour or so before sunset on 3^rd December (that is at least two hours before sunset in West Pakistan) Captain Hanif, the PIA chief in Dacca, whom I knew from Risalpur when he was under training,  came to see me in the Mess and said war is starting tonight. A PIA Boeing which was coming to Dacca, flying opposite Madras (now Chennai) and only an hour or so short of Dacca, was ordered by Karachi through Indian Flight Information Centre to return back to base.  Eastern Command and rest of people learnt about it from 9 PM TV news.

As for PAF’s pre-emptive air strike on 3^rd Dec, I learnt from Air Commodore Grewal, Director Air Intelligence IAF, who came to see me at Fort Williams, Calcutta, that PAF’s strike against seven IAF Bases caused only superficial damage. Had it concentrated against two or three bases only, IAF would have been in some trouble. Grewal also wondered as to how Air Commodore ‘Polly’ Shah, a transport pilot with whom he had undergone conversion on C-47 Dakota aircraft before partition in Mauripur, could have been Operations Chief in Air Headquarters. I gave some lame explanation.

IAF had ten Squadrons of Mig-21, Su-7 and Hunter aircraft deployed at bases around East Pakistan.  Anticipating air raids without any MOU in operation, we would not get attack warning of more than 3 or 4 minutes from our low level radar. From dawn of 4^th December 1971, No 14 Squadron started launching a pair F-86s every half hour, so as to maintain Combat Air Patrol (CAP), ready to respond to an oncoming raid instantly. As expected, the IAF raiders started early and flew in low. They were picked up by the CAPs and a number of them shot down. Some of attackers did manage to slip through to Dacca and Kurmitola despite our boosting the CAP effort to four aircraft at a time. CAPs are very demanding both for pilots and aircraft. After the pre-hostilites loss of one aircraft that went into a river due to vertigo of pilot, and two lost at Jessore in November, we were left with nine F-86s only. The pilot strength was about the same.  Due to this paucity of both man and machine, the CAP effort reduced as the day progressed. On reaching Dacca airfield, the attackers encountered our Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery equipped with Chinese guns having a range of 7,000 feet. The attackers failed to destroy even a single fighter aircraft on the ground in pens.  Our two helicopters, which were operating from playground of a school in domestic camp escaped enemy attention and both safely escaped to Burma on 16^th morning. (I cannot ever forget the heart rending pleas made by PAF helicopter pilot Squadron Leader Masud and by my younger brother, then Major Riaz-ul-Haq Khan, an Mi-8 Captain, for accompanying and escaping with them, but that was out of question.) Air Marshal Rahim Khan also rang me up to advise me not to escape. I angrily asked the C-in-C as to what made him think that I was planning to escape, as I had no intention to leave my sub-ordinates in this critical situation.

There were, two PIA Twin Otter aircraft, which were hidden under the trees, no pen being large enough to hide them. On 4^th December I was at Killer Control (a small platform perched above the tree line, equipped with R/T for a pilot to visually guide or warn own aircraft of the attacker behind him) when we saw an IAF Su-7 make a short firing pass on one of the Otters, barely 150 yards away from us. This was enough to destroy the soft-skinned passenger airplane.  The Su-7 hurriedly lit the after-burner and zoomed away. We had planned to fly our fighter pilots out to Burma in the Twin Otters, if and when fighter operations become impossible, so that they could continue the war in West Pakistan.  It was very lucky that the second Twin Otter survived.

On the third day around 11 AM,  when all our fighters were down, IAF Mig-21s armed with bombs cratered the runway every two to three thousand feet. It made the runway totally unfit for F-86s to operate.  These craters on the runway were about 20 feet deep and 50 feet wide, with volcano-like upward thrusting lips of runway slabs.  Craters were deep due to time-delay fuses on these sleek bombs. Quick repairing of runway need large amounts of sand, with loading and dumping vehicles, cement slab cutting machines and quick-setting cement. None of the equipment and material was available; nor was repair time available due to frequent strikes by fighter-bombers, now orbiting safely at 10,000 feet beyond the AAA range with no interceptor to chase them. They would dive steeply along the runway for releasing bombs, exposing themselves to AAA for a very short time. Some raids inflicted casualties on the repairing teams which were doing whatever little they could, with all the handicaps. At the end of the third day of bombing, I inspected the big craters. Fully aware that Dacca runway would not be available for fighter operations any more during the war, I decided to fly the fighter pilots to Burma in PIA’s surviving Twin Otter.  I saw eight or nine remaining pilots at dawn and could sense their sympathetic feelings on leaving me behind. The Twin Otter took off from a taxi track.

Our pilots and airmen connected with air operations did a magnificent job under  some very adverse limitations and conditions, both during air support phase and later during combat phase against IAF from 3^rd to 6^th December, 1971.  As for the pilots, I must mention our very brave Base Operations Officer, Wing Commander S M Ahmed who was not required to be on combat duty, but volunteered to participate. On second day that is on 5^th December, 1971 he intercepted a formation of intruders about 10 miles north of  Dacca. After targeting one attacker, he was bracketed by a pair of IAF fighters who shot him down. He was seen ejecting out and landing safely, as observed by a Pak Army Subedar.  He then saw Wing Commander Ahmed  swarmed by locals and some Mukti Bahini from nearby Tangail who took him way. We never got any further news about him; presumably he was tortured and later killed in cold blood. For us, as stated earlier, our own territory was akin to enemy country.

Indian Canberra bombers also kept on raiding frequently at night. Their bombing was hopeless, doing little damage to any important installation. A bomb fell not too far from my house, and close to the bungalow where Begum Khalida Zia was detained. A stray bomb, however, did land on our Officers’ Mess, the debris from which fell on many of the personnel in trenches. Squadron Leader Rabbani, the only Bengali officer loyal to Pakistan till the very end, died immediately. May Allah rest Rabbani in peace, Ameen. (He was one of my last students pilot at Risalpur in 1953. He later became a Navigator.) The following morning, I had gone to see an injured General officer at CMH. The place was cluttered with dead and injured, the air putrid all over. By chance I entered a room in which dead bodies were stacked and I was shocked to see our Senior Air Traffic Officer lying among the dead but breathing very feebly. His lungs were in a mess, being the result of previous night’s bombing on Officers’ Mess. On my pointing out, the medical staff worked on him and brought him back to life, literally.

It was  a revelation for me to learn from the HRC Report about the Naval suggestion for our F-86s to be diverted from air defense duties during the war to search for the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikrant in the vast Bay of Bengal. The idea was to sink it or at least cause some damage so as to  boost our morale!

Navies employ multi-engine aircraft (such as the twin-engine French Atlantique or four-engine Lockheed P-3C Orion), having long endurance and fitted with radar and other detection devices to reconnoiter and locate enemy warships and submarines. Old fighters like the F-86, with hardly any maritime sensor and, with a short endurance, were not capable of carrying out the mission as suggested.  I feel that the suggestion had overtones of a suicide mission, which I would have trashed, if it had been brought to my notice in Dacca. Hamood-ur-Rahman showed better understanding in dismissing such an operation as unfeasible, particularly when the mission would not have gone unintercepted by Vikrant’s Sea Hawk interceptors.

Aftermath

During the summer before the war, the Chinese Counsellor came to my office, emphasizing the need for a political solution rather than military.  But the visit by IG Police, East Pakistan along with Commissioner Dacca during the war was strange to say the least. Knowing fully all the shortcomings, conditions and handicaps, they surprisingly said, “So Air Commodore ‘your army’ is incapable of defending the country.” This was most unbecoming of these high officials and I nearly threw them out. Later both, after foregoing their Pakistani citizenship, approached the UN representative for shelter in Hotel Pearl Continental (declared as neutral area), but the request was rejected, forcing them to stay in the Cantonment. Ironically, after the war one of them became Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan!

The war lingered on with assurances of aid from North and South. The policy of fixed defence along the border was henceforth to continue, no retreat to Dacca Bowl, as stipulated in War Plan, was to be attempted officially. Diplomatic efforts were also being made in and outside UN with some solution like retaining both East and West Pakistan intact within a Confederation. It was not to the liking of the PPP leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who wished for a quick unconditional defeat in Dacca at the earliest. That is why the War Plan of retreating to Dacca Bowl was not allowed, as it may have prolonged the war and delayed surrender, allowing more time for a possible peaceful resolution, retaining the integrity of Pakistan.  When detailed to lead the mission to UN, he took his own sweet time enroute, hoping for an early surrender in the mean time. In the Security Council he played the drama of scornfully tearing the notes pertaining to the only sensible Polish Resolution and walking out angrily.  He had put up a similar drama in UN Security Council in 1965 when he dashed out after calling the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh a dog. S M Khan, who was the High Commissioner in Canada at the time and was a member of the delegation, had to follow him. On getting out of the chamber he turned to S M Khan and said ‘dekha sain kaisi acting keeti hey’. This time in 1971 it was an encore.  That walk-out ended all hopes of one Pakistan.

HRC considered that we should have destroyed the F-86s  immediately after dispatch of the pilots to Burma. The reason for not destroying the aircraft earlier was that it was thought to be an easy task to dynamite aircraft and could be done any time. This we undertook on 15^th December, after receiving surrender orders but were told not to cause explosions which might cause alarm and panic. Hence, hammers and crowbars, etc were used  quite effectively. Bangladesh Air Force might have recovered some of the aircraft through cannibalization of others, but they were never made them operationally ready.

During preparations for the war, fighter aircraft pens were constructed at Dacca with wire mesh on top, covered with foliage. Taxi tracks leading to these pens were also camouflaged. Due to these measures not a single fighter aircraft was destroyed  on the ground. The brunt of the repeated attacks was borne only by wooden dummy aircraft four each of which were placed at both ends of Dacca and Kurmitola runways, (although the latter runway was still under construction).

During the surrender ceremony in Ramna Maidan in Dacca City, Air Marshal Dewan, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, IAF Eastern Command met me. He first praised our performance under such an adverse environment. He then said that the IAF made a fool of themselves in continual attacks on dummies alone. He then enquired as to how come Pakistani military commanders in East Pakistan were not C-in-Cs and were being controlled by Rawalpindi? I replied that for all intent and purposes  we considered ourselves independent.

Before 16^th December, hardly any Bengali was visible anywhere, but from that morning onwards they started pouring in large numbers from nowhere onto the airfield, streets and were present in great  number at this ceremony. Mukti Bahini were thrashing and killing non- Bengalis even during the ceremony while nearby Indian troops made no attempt to stop the carnage. A small group of Mukti Bahini approached and addressed me, ignoring the Indian Air Commodore (my escort) standing besides me, and said “thank you Sir for liberating us from the Pakistani barbarians”. When I replied that I am one of those barbarians, they got perplexed and slipped away.

For a couple of  days after surrender, the Indian GOC of the formation investing Dacca allowed us to retain our arms, as the Mukti Bahini had started sniping at our personnel in our Camps.  Our men retaliated and killed a few snipers. This could have flared into a serious problem, so I went to the Indian GOC for restraining the Mukti Bahini from provocative shooting. The Indian GOC was occupying the office of General Niazi, sitting on his chair while Niazi was sitting on one side and, without any remorse, telling jokes and laughing. On my request, the Indian GOC called in Brig Shabeg Singh and asked whether the Mukti Bahini could be restrained. Shabeg hurriedly consulted Tiger Siddiqui, (Commander, Tangail Mukti Bahini) who was standing in the veranda outside,  and reported back  that  they would not be able to comply. The GOC then ordered Shabeg to accompany me to the Base, where the latter contacted the Officer Commanding of an Infantry Battalion to sort out the sniping.  On reaching the office, the Battalion Commander was called in and assigned the task. During this period Shabeg Singh told me that he was  in charge of Mukti Bahini training and organizing in Agartala Sector. He had made many trips into East Pakistan and  Dacca prior to war. His last trip to Dacca was on 3^rd December, masquerading as a rickshaw driver with his small beard flowing and balding head covered with a white maulvi cap. Shabeg Singh also offered me safe-keeping of any jewelry or fire arms that I may have had. I had none. As luck would have it, he was promoted and posted as GOC Jubbulpur where our camp was located. Later, after retirement, he became the Military Advisor to Sikh militant politician Jarnail Singh Bhindrawala. When Bhindrawala threw a challenge to the authority of Union Government, a strong-willed Mrs Gandhi ordered an attack on the sacred Golden Temple at Amritsar  in 1984. Shabeg Singh who was killed by Indian troops during the attack.

On 15^th December, while driving, I was stopped by a bearded, well-dressed  gentleman who turned out to be the Chief Flying Instructor of Dacca Flying Club. He was famous for his flying prowess throughout India. He enquired of me whether it  was true about the surrender. On my confirmation he tore at his beard and clothes and said what will happen to the Biharis now. His apprehensions turned out to be correct, as can be seen from the squalid conditions of camps where they have been living ever since, under very adverse conditions. Urdu-speaking Biharis never integrated with the Bengalis and retained their own language, culture and traditions. They always considered themselves as true Pakistanis which they proved by their loyalties till the end, incurring the wrath of locals. Biharis were relatively better educated than Bengalis, and were also technically qualified, thus running railways, telephone and telegraph and other technical services. They were, however, all along considered as traitors for their open support to West Pakistani troops and civilians. After the war, Biharis justifiably expected to be repatriated to Pakistan. Barring a handful, no Pakistan Government permitted their repatriation. This reprehensible treatment in disowning patriotic Pakistanis would remain a blemish on Pakistan.

The night 15/16^th December, 1971 was traumatic and hectic to say the least. Army helicopters were flying out to Burma in the early hours. An injured General was also a passenger on one, without the knowledge of General Niazi who was annoyed by his departure. Niazi wanted all the six General officers to accompany him, a logic which is difficult to understand. There were three Pak Army Divisions in East Pakistan, hence only General Officers should, at best, have remained with  him.  Offering three additional trophies to the Indians was not called for.

On repatriation to Pakistan, I was told by none less than the Chief of Air Staff of PAF that the sole purpose of going to war was to extricate West Pakistanis safely across India, therefore no meaningful operation against India was undertaken. This was not understood or acceptable to highly patriotic and professionally outstanding officers such as Brigadier F B Ali or Group Captain A M Sikander who rightly blamed Yahya for the break up of Pakistan.  Several of these officers were tried by General Court Martial (GCM) for engineering a conspiracy against the State.  General Zia-ul-Haq, heading the Attock GCM appreciated the sensitivity of the situation correctly and  awarded punishments to only a few. On the contrary, PAF overdid itself on the grounds of not tolerating indiscipline. It held a sadistic GCM at Badaber and awarded severe punishments to the cream of our small Air Force, the ill effects of which lasted for decades.

Mercifully, later the PAF did a better job of treating its repatriated POWs. It prematurely retired only once officer while most went on to continue their careers successfully. The Army POWs were, however shabbily treated, on grounds that they  had been brain washed.

The Villains

It is true that the seeds of hatred had been sown a long time ago. This hatred was nurtured over the years due to arrogant, callous, unjust, bigoted, short-sighted, and disdainful policies of the West Pakistani establishment and self-serving politicians.  Seeds of such hatred were sown right in the beginning, when Urdu was declared the official language of Pakistan, ignoring the rich Bengali language and culture of the majority. In such a sorry milieu, it is not easy to vilify individuals, but the actions of three actors are far too obvious to be overlooked.

I had little respect for Shaikh Mujib since I met him once in Los Angeles in 1957 at a dinner in his honour given by two Lahori brothers who were students in University of Southern California. I too was attending a course in USC. He was then an important politician holding the post of Secretary General of Awami League under Mr Suhrawardy. During dinner I was expecting him to speak on national issues facing Pakistan, politics, current and international affairs etc, but I was shocked to hear him talk mostly about women. Shaikh Mujib was neither an intellectual nor a man of principles, he was simply a loud-mouthed rabble rouser. Hard core policies and decisions were made by the hardliner Tajuddin sitting in Calcutta, with his coterie. In the sixties, Mujib was fully involved in Agartala Conspiracy. He was declared innocent on the urging of some of our well meaning leaders so that he could attend a round table conference chaired by Ayub Khan, as he tried desperately to hold on to power. This action by Ayub made Mujeeb an overnight hero in the eyes of Bengalis who had doubts about his involvement in the conspiracy.

Yahya Khan blundered naively in permitting Sheikh Mujib of Awami League to fight election of Dec ‘70 on the basis of his notorious Six Point manifesto. However, Yahya should have accepted the outcome of elections once held fairly and legally. He blundered again by not ensuring holding of Assembly session on 2^nd March at Dacca as planned, and handing over the government to the majority party, regardless. One thing is certain, Mujib once in power would NEVER have seceded from Pakistan for bringing about Bangladesh. Any one opposing holding of this session or instigating and threatening members who wished to attend, should have been arrested for sedition or at least isolated, for defying the writ of the government. Yahya foolishly kept on vacillating from one party to the other till he was led into a trap by Bhutto, convincing Yahya to commit yet another blunder on 26^th March 1971. Military action suited Bhutto, as he would have never been able to form a government once the parity of seats between the two wings was fairly but unwittingly abolished, giving more seats to East Pakistan on population basis. Yahya Khan also abolished One Unit system of each wing, thus reviving provincial rivalries.  In doing so, a naïve and simpleton Yahya undid what was achieved with great effort, viz parity of members in National Assembly, so graciously accepted by East Pakistanis. Yahya committed his last blunder in initiating the war which  appalled Chinese and other friendly countries, but pleased some of our leaders. Most happy was ‘that woman’ Mrs Indira Gandhi, since she was frantically looking for an excuse to undo the unity of Pakistan.

Clarification

Before I finish, I would like to clarify some confusion in the ‘Conclusion’ of Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report with my comments in brackets.  The concluding paragraph in verbatim  states: “Before, the air force was grounded by reason of Indian attack (due to cratering of runway around mid-day on 6^th Dec) it had indeed performed creditably.  Before 3^rd December, 1971, it had been of some considerable use and in all it had succeeded in destroying 11 (enemy) aircraft. (These aircraft were shot between 3^rd and mid-day 6^th Dec and not before 3^rd, as stated incorrectly by the report. What they perhaps mean  was very effective air support to Army till 3^rd December, 1971 which is fully covered in the text above. Shooting 11 aircraft up to 6^th Dec was creditable as per their stated judgment). On the whole, therefore, we have reached  to the conclusion that  while the performance of the air force deserves praise in the phase at least before 3^rd December, 1971, (actually meaning period till the end of air operations from 3^rd till 6^th December – confusing dates again) their performance thereafter was disappointing”. (After crediting good performance, ie shooting down of 11 enemy aircraft till 6^th December, 1971, only two issues described in the text give these remarks of disapproval. Those two issues were regarding dispatch of pilots without waiting enough for runway to be repaired, and secondly for  not destroying F-86s soon after dispatch of these  pilots, rationale for action regarding both  points is amply stated  at length, in preceding paragraphs).

A Prayer

In the end I would like to pray to Allah for granting  Pakistanis the wisdom to appreciate the value of FREEDOM  and to cherish and nurture it through sincere and honest application, in word and deed, of the most apt words: UNITY, FAITH, DISCIPLINE prescribed by the Father of the Nation.  Pakistan Zindabad.

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Jinnah’s story is Pakistan’s story.(Biography of Jinnah by Stanley Wolpert is a must read for all Pakistanis). Jinnah single handedly brought about Pakistan, one of the two ideological state of the world, other being Israel . After Liaquat there was no leader worth a name. Jagirdars, waderas, etc and later Maulvies like Maududi . who were against creation of Pakistan hijacked it. Jinnah wanted a secular state with equal rights and complete of freedom to all religions. Punjabis, being ghulamana, obedient and slave-like mentality had leaders like Tiwanas, who were also against Pakistan, Frontier being dominated by Congressite Ghaffar Khan aka Frontier Gandhi, naturally supporting Hindu Congress as it (Congress) claimed to represent Muslims as well. Ghaffar Khan’s son Wali Khan and family are still loyal to India. All Indian dignitaries visiting Pakistan go and meet them in Charsada. Ghaffar Khan refused to be buried in Pakistan. So he was interred in Jalalabad, Adil Khattak attended the burial. Ghaffar khan’s family has property at Bombay Baluchistan was the only province which whole heartedly accepted Pakistan and Urdu as official language. It was Jinnahs advocation which brought Punjab and Frontier to its fold. Jinnah was a highly successful Lawyer of Bombay, very logical, clear headed, great orator and articulator, strictly law abiding in actions, honest to the nth degree. He was initially not only a member of Congress Party, but even its President. He was known as the ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity. But he soon found that Indian Congress Party was basically a Hindu Party. United Province now known as Uttar Pradesh, Congress did not not give even a single seat to Muslims, while they deserved 30 % seats. Crafty, so called ‘Mahatama’ Gandhi, though claimed that for him Hindus and Muslims were alike, but when Nehru’s sister Vijay Lakhshmi Pandit wanted to marry Ali Imam of Patna, he opposed it tooth and nail.

Earlier in 1920 Jinnah was disgusted by the selfish behaviour of Muslim Leaders, so he left for UK. Later in early thirties Agha Khan and other leaders like Allama Iqbal, Ali Bros (Shoukat Ali and Mohd Ali), etc realizing his capability, qualities and worth, prevailed upon him to attend the Round Table conferences in UK, representing Muslims of India. He returned to India in around 1933 and organized Muslim League as the sole party representing Muslims, despite chagrins and protests by Hindu Congress.

Towards the end of WW 2 (!939-1945) Great Britain became weak and wanted to hand over power to Indians. Many British delegations led by capable persons like Sir Stafford Cripps etc came with solutions fair to both Hindus and Muslims. Mr Jinnah every time considered the proposals coolly with colleague’s and in couple of days gave a positive response. Nehru on the other hand impetuously discarded the solutions since Muslims were given due rights in these. Even when Mountbatten’s came as Viceroy in late 1946 with full powers to settle the issue, Mr. Jinnah accepted his proposal of India-Pakistan confederation, having common joint foreign affairs, currency and defense. Nehru rejected it outright, as he, considering that Pakistan will not last long, prevailed upon Mountbatten to offer a truncated Pakistan, without Firozepur. Pathankot Districts, etc. Boundary Demarcation Commission was headed by Mr. Radcliffe a noble Judge who came to India for the first time, in hot and humid (No ACs then) end Jul,y only 15 days before partition.  He did not know or understand issues involved. So he signed on the dotted line as dictated to by Mountbatten, who in turn was guided by sly Nehru who had developed very good relations with Mountbatten. Nehru in turn was under the influence of Vallabbhai Patel, a very strong headed Home Minister longing for free India, a rabid Muslim hater but a great thinker. He violated all agreed rules and formuli, occupied Kashmir because ruler was a Hindu who was coaxed into accession with India, though Muslims had majority in Kashmir and should have joined Pakistan. In case of Hyderabad despite ruler being a Muslim willing to join Pakistan, was forcibly annexed by India since Hindus were in majority. Similarly he took over by force Pakistan bordering Junagarh and couple of other small states in Kathiawar Katch areas with Muslim Rulers who had acceded to Pakistan though these had Hindus in majority He interpreted rules according to “Head I win, tail you lose” whatever suited him. Patel also integrated all Princely States with main India despite Congress firm assurances to the contrary. On behest of Nehru and his coterie the Division of India was rushed without any proper planning/preparations for ensuring law and order during transition, or for establishing proper set up for a new government of a new country. Intentions were obvious, early collapse of Pakistan. Mr Jinnah once observed that you can trace the path of a fish in a fish bowl, but one cannot fathom the thinking of a Brahmin. When I was POW in India, almost every senior Indian Army officer would say that Pakistan has nothing to fear from India, and in the same breath would ask “wasn’t creation of Pakistan a mistake”. Indians are determined to turn whole of India into HINDUTVA sooner or later, and therefore have not and will never accept Pakistan despite all their chicanery and sweet publicity to the contrary.

This rushed decision, attributed to NH and Patel for not letting Pakistan to stabilize, caused massive loss of lives and property on either sides. To destabilize they further withheld Pakistan’s share of treasury, military equipment, ordnance all other assets. I know junk IAF aircraft were passed on to Pakistan Air Force as its share. Even Tiger Moth light training aircraft, when being flown to Karachi from Jodhpur, sugar was put in fuel tanks, engines ceasing after a while thus forcing them to crash land. Crafty Gandhi being far sighted and for continued influence over Pakistan and Muslims, insisted upon Nehru Government to transfer its share of treasury to Pakistan. He was shot and killed by a Hindu Marahatta Godse.( My first flying instructor at Karachi Flying Club was also a Hindu Marhatta Gogte) Hindu leaders being far sighted, started war like preparations well before partition to cater for all eventualities, including violent means to achieve their aims. One could then see the RSS (Rashtria Sevak Sang) being the Military wing of BJP (Bharatia Janata Party – Janata means people, whose goal is Hindutva – India for Hindus only) youth in Patiala and other cities, drilling and practicing military acts dressed in white shirts and khaki shorts. In Bassi they were conducting this training at dawn (when the Muslims were still asleep) less than a mile from our Ashraf Manzil at a large temple called Bhun next to a big pond meant for holy bath. Thus a rushed division suited Congress who were sure of an early collapse of Pakistan hence they not only accepted but insisted upon immediate partition with this hope. I must however relate that at Bombay Mr Jinnah was under the treatment of Dr Patel a Hindu Dr who diagnosed TB of Mr Jinnah and had predicted that he would not last more than a year. Had he revealed this info, Nehru would have dilly dallied and there would have been no Pakistan.

When Pakistan realized that Patel is usurping Kashmir and flying in troops, Patiala providing the first lot, Pathans from Frontier were the first to rush to Srinagar. Being indisciplined, instead of securing airfield so as not to let Indian troops fly in, they wasted time and indulged in looting. Indian troops soon managed to push them out. Pakistan Army was independent now and had a British General Gracey in command. Mr Jinnah ordered him to rush troops to Srinagar, instead he contacted his old boss Field Marshal Auchinlack in Delhi for instructions, who naturally did not agree to send Pak Army to Kashmir. Though Gracey was removed soon but the damage had been done. I know we had RAF officers as CinC and on other high posts in PAF. Barring first CinC Air Vice Marshal Atcherley, rest were all passengers only trying to help Brtish economy by making us buy obsolescent UK aircraft and equipment at exorbitant prices and much more than we needed. For example British CinC Air Marshal Cannon, bought 110 crude looking and full of bugs Bristol Freighters as against our requirement of only ten to twelve aircraft. That is why Air Marshal Asghar Khan having only 17 years of service was much better Chief than experienced but foxy Britishers.

Indian Congress party despite their claim of being secular. Abul Kalam Azad, born in Madina fully versed in Arabic, having full grasps of Islam, having translated and providing explanation of Quran first 18 Chaptes in 4 volumes, first volume covering Sura Fateha only, he did this while in prison, but could not complete as as he was released after he had translated first 18 Chapters. His translation and explanation is the best in my opinion despite of his being Azad and self opinionated. I got best consolation and comfort from it. Towards the end of his life he wrote a book titled “India Wins Freedom”. Though he had been President of Congress Party for several years and President of India, he is very critical of Nehru and coterie of Vallabhai Patel, Krishna Menon, etc. In the book he willed that I have written another 30 pages which should be published 30 years after his death. He died in mid fifties, but those pages are yet to be published. Intellectual Dishonesty. Recently a stalwart of BJP and ex Foreign Minister under Prime Minister Vajpai, Jaswant Singh, a Rajput, has written a book on Jinnah denying the Indian myth of Jinnah to be blamed for division of India. He has correctly blamed Nehru and Congress. There has been violent protest in India against this book and its author, it is being burnt at many places. Jaswant Singh’s book is the first one in above mentioned Wikipedia. Not released for general sale yet. Wikipedia also refers to many books on the subject even Urdu ones.

Shallowness of Nehru’s thinking and his impulsive nature is best seen in his stubborn and illogical handling of 1962 China border War with India where it cut a sorry figure with Chinese troops encircling NEFA Capital Tezpur. Chinese Commander asked for permission for arresting Indian General Commanding General Kaul. For permission Chinese Vice Chairman Standing Committee of Chinese Communist Party cum Vice Premier cum De fence Minister cum Chief of the General Staff commanding all the three services by the name Lo Ri Ching (known as Beria of China) wax contacted. A tall impressive soldier whom I met when he had a meeting with Air Marshal Nur Khan CinC PAF during his visit to Peking. In that meeting he criticized himself for not allowing General Kaul’s arrest. During Cultural Revolution later I saw his picture where Red Guards of Mao’ wife forced him onto a donkey with dunce cap on his head and facing backwards – indicating utter insult and condemnation. Similar treatment was meted to many other great leaders including Teng Shia Ping who later brought China to great prosperity and success. Soon after the war Chinese repatriated all captured Indian soldiers with their cleaned and polished weapons.(Had Mrs Indira Gandhi done the same to Pakistani POWs, Pakistan wold have collapsed). In this War Krishna Menon led Nehru up the garden path from where he never recovered till his death. It is best related in a book called “India’s China War” by Neville Maxwell, a British Times correspondent for umpteen years in Delhi prior to 1962. A must read book to understand India. Exposes very well how unreasonable and cunning are the Indians. When this Indo China war started, fearing an attack by Pakistan on Kashmir from where all Indian troops had been depleted, Nehru begged President Kennedy to assure Ayub Khan not take advantage as Nehru would definitely solve Kashmir issue after the war. Kennedy sent Averil Harriman who met Ayub at Peshawer Air Base for conveying assurance. Subsequently many meetings between Swaran Sigh and Z A Bhutto took place but to no avail till 1965 War commenced. An opportunity of the century for Pakistan was thus lost. Nehru never had the intentions of giving up Kashmir being a Kashmiri Pandit himself.

But Indians do have good qualities too. As compared to Muslims of the sub-continent, Hindus are better educated producing every year large number of scholars, scientists, philosophers, specialists in every filed. As compared to Pakistan, Indians are better disciplined, more civic sense, frugal in their habits have simpler life style, and of course far better and advanced acumen and discernment about trade , industry and commerce. Dedication of Indian diplomats in foreign missions have but to be admired. One episode to high light this point. In 1958 I was attending a Course in University of Southern California, Los Angeles. There were 3 Hussain brothers from Lahore also studying there. I was Squadron Leader in PAF then. On day they invited me to a meeting in Ambassador Hotel, Wilshire Blvd where Pakistani Ambassador will listen to problems faced by students in USA. I tagged along purely for curiosity sake. Every one reached the hotel at appointed time 5 PM, except the newly wedded (To his Secretary in DC, his second marriage, first wife at Bogra) His Excellency the Ambassador Mohd Ali Bogra, who later became Prime Minister of Pakistan. Eventually he turned up over one hour late. Before he could get into discussing students about their problem, Pakistani Counselor in San Francisco ex IAF Ex Wing Commander Shaffi, a Christian, rushed him through as HE had another engagement. Very frustrating for Hussain and others. One of Hussains told me then that his sister Razia is studying at Purdue University. A few weeks back Indian HE Jha visited the University. First thing on reaching there he inquired was whether there is any Pakistani student. On being told about Razia he asked to be taken to her first. HE Jha goes to her room and said to Razia, “Beti, I know you are from Pakistan but can I do anything for you”. Call it a PR Stunt, chicanery, or anything else but the impact of this gesture need no imagination. In other missions too Indians were dedicated as compared to Pakistani counterparts.

Before I conclude I must state, despite their other good features, Hindus suffer from a MAJOR flaw, they are small hearted which led to Partition, incapable of performing a gracious act (like release of POWs). That is why, as pointed out by British Historian Toynbee, Hindus have never in the past, barring a short period of about 200 years of rule by Gupta/Ashoka prior to birth of Christ, and will never in future govern INDIA. They would, however, perform well only as top administrators. AMEN

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On October 13th. 2009, Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman of PAF participated in the rolling out ceremony of the first of the eighteen F-16C Block 52 aircraft. You can see the album of more images of the ceremony by clicking on the image below.

You can read more about my thoughts on the subject at the pakistaniat blog.

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